OF AFFECTATION

A Morall diſcourſe, of *ſome delight, and of much vſe for theſe times,*

The firſt Part.

Qualis quiſque ſit ſcies, ſi quemadmodum laudetur adſpexeris.

SEN. Epiſt. LII.

AT LONDON,
Printed by H. L. for MATHEVV LOVVNES: *and are to be ſolde at his ſhop in Paules Church-yard.* 1607.

To my courteous Reader.

THE vſuall vnfriēdly entertaynment, many times churliſh, oft affected, wherewith the exercíſes of witte (ſometimes wittie exercíſes) are receiued, hath ſo frequently mooued my commiſeration in others; that I hitherto perſwaded, and religiouſly promiſed my ſelfe, I ſhould not need to ſtand in feare of the like daunger, the which I haue ſeen ſo many well deſeruing men incurre, if at the leaſt my owne purpoſe and reſolation heerein, might bee able to warrant mee. But, it ſeemeth that

hardly any thing can bee commented, though neuer so abhorring publicke view, which vndergoeth not enforcing; whether it bee that there wanteth matter for ennie, or that it bewithstore to bee oppreſſed. For, no ſooner had I, at the requeſt of a deare friend (which hath alwaies with mee the force of a lawe) with whome, vpon an accident voluntarilie preſenting this theame, it vvas my happe to diſcourſe of the common exceſſe of this inordinate affecte of our mindes, Affectation; endeuoured my ſelfe, for his ſatisfaction, to ſet downe what I vnderſtood thereof: but that it ſeemed vnto him, not vnfit to paſſe abroad into the hands of men. And, not ſatisfied with his opinion, hee was ſo earneſt to accompliſh the performance, that no reſiſtance could withhold, euen vnperfit as it is, (what do I ſay vnperfit? ſcarce begun) from the publiſhing thereof. But, as I haue yeelded to the miſſion, ſo haue I denyed my Paſſe. Since it muſt wander, vpholde it that will. Within my reach I would haue patronized it: it is now become of euery mans iuriſdiction, and

with (or in) their opinions, must either rise, or fall: yet shall it haue this helpe aboue the rest, That no sooner shall any begin to mislike it, but that it shall presently encounter him, telling him in his eare, that hee affecteth. *And thus much I will farther be bolde to say in the behalfe thereof, that, howsoeuer the manner and handling may be esteemed, the attempt and end thereof cannot bee other then commendable. For, if you consider and weigh well the reason, for what cause the compositions, which our fine affected wits so copiously and headlong prease daily vnto the Presse, finde so sleight and momentany entertainment, some perhaps of once the reading, others not so much: you shall discouer it to bee no other, then that for the most part they are built vpon vaine and immateriall subiects, things of no poise or moment; & are many times but the exercise of a sale witt. The which sort indeed seem not to be so well armed against contempt, as are those, whose ends yet are profitable, though they doe no more, but euen represent vnto our memory the consideration of some thing, which*

is worthily, or neceſſarily to be thought on by vs. For, if it be lawfull to do with our owne what we liſt; how ſhall it not be lawfull for vs to approoue or diſlike that, which beeing intended to the ſale, wee haue purchaſed and wholly made our own? Or, with what face can any man call another in queſtion for his euill vſage of that, which hee hath abſolutely ſoulde him, eſpecially not hauing couenanted before hand with him thereof? Farre otherwiſe is it with theſe kinds, which labour to profit more then to delight (as alſo with this, which whoſoeuer hath, I yet accoũt mine own, becauſe extorted) which, albeit in the performance they may vndergoe the want of iudgement, they cannot loſe the opinion of well meaning. The ſtile is eaſie and vulgar, accommodated but to the common vnderſtanding; ſo farre from beeing filed and poliſhed, that it is ſcarcely ouerlooked. Wherein, in truth, I haue thought it fit to vſe the more neglect, leaſt whileſt I reproue other, my ſelfe be not vndeſeruedly called in queſtion for affecting. And, to ſay the truth what needeth, nay why ſhould it boe other?

[a] Non mehercules (*ſayth* SENECA) ieiuna & arida eſſe volo, quæ de rebus tam magnis dicentur: neq; enim philoſophia ingenio renunciat: multum tamen operæ impēdi verbis non oportet. I vvill not haue thoſe diſcourſes barren and dry, which are made of ſo great things: for philoſophy renounceth not wit: yet ought we not to ſpēd much labor in words. *Adding notwithſtanding ſoone after*; [b] Si tamen eloquentia contingere non ſollicito poteſt, aut ſi parata eſt, aut paruo conſtat, aſſit, & res pulcherrimas proſequatur. Sit talis, vt res potius quàm ſe oſtēdat. Aliæ artes ad ingenium totæ pertinent: hîc animi negotium agitur. Notwithſtanding, if eloquence may happen, without too much care taking, if it be at hand, or may be had good cheape, let it be vſed, and wait vpon the worthieſt ſubiects. Let it be ſuch, that it rather ſet foorth the matter than ſhewe it ſelfe. Other Arts wholy belong to the wits: in this are handled the affaires of the mind. *A ſicke man (ſayth he) ſeeketh*

[a] *Epiſt. LXXV.*

[b] *Ibidem.*

not out an eloquent Physician but a healing. Neuertheleſſe if it ſo fall out, that he who is expert in healing, can alſo elegantly diſcourſe of thoſe things which he praſcribeth, it is very commendable. Yet neither is there cauſe why the Patient ſhould be pleaſed in himſelfe and reioyce, that hee hath lighted vpon a diſert Phyſician: [c] *hoc enim tale eſt, quale ſi peritus gubernator etiam formoſus eſt;* For this is ſuch as if a skilfull Gouernour be alſo fayre. *And no doubt, to whome eloquence is at hand, hee cannot better imploy it, then in theſe ſubiects. Yet neither ought he to be remooned from them, to whom it is denyed; ſo as he be able to bring iudgement, and matter. To enforme you here of my ſubiect, were to repeate it twice: the following diſcourſe will ſuddenly inſtruct you. Onely the occaſion of the rather making choice of this, I will not conceale: which was (in truth) the continuall exceſſe, or rather deſired acceſſe vnto this abſurde humour. The which ſo powerfully leading the apprehenſions of men, I know not yet whether there bee any paſſion, which findeth leſſe reſi-*

[c] Sene. ibid.

ſtance, or more. *Moue I ſay, becauſe this fond humor deſcried (as it eaſily diſcouereth it ſelfe, being like vnto the Sea wracke, which alwaies floateth at the top) is by euery one reſiſted, condemned, and derided. Leſſe,* * *for that euen thoſe who moſt of all miſlike it in others, are not only content to admit, but greedily to embrace it in themſelues. The reaſon of this ſee hereafter. And the rather did I hold it not abſurd to diſcuſſe this point, ſeeing the daily abuſe therin followeth not the meaneſt and weakeſt capacities, but the wideſt alſo & moſt extended. Whom what marualle is it though the ſofter apprehenſions do ſtriue to imitate and follow?* [d] Error honeſtus eſt, magnos duces ſequentibus. Error is commendable in them vvho followe the example of great men. *But, leaſt in the handling of this theame, my frequent citations to ſome glaring eyes might appeare affected: I holde it neceſſary to occurre, not onely to what probably, but alſo moſt vnſenſibly may be obiected: the ſooner, if they may any way ſeem to obiect that whereunto I haue alwaies oppoſed my ſelfe, euer ſince I had a-*

* Eſt proprium ſtultitiæ aliorum vitia cernere, obliuiſci ſuorum. Cic. Tuſc. 3.

[d] M. Fab. Quinctil. Orat. lib. 1. cap. 10.

bility to discerne. Two things therefore most especially moued me thereunto; Antiquity, *and* Authority. *The* Antiquity *of the Authors (which for the most part I alleage) the more inuited me; for that we might beholde, that euen in those times there were also such, who were iustly to bee reprehended for this vice: which was esteemed by them so exorbitaunt, that they thought it not vnworthy their labour to endeuour by all their might to represse it. Their* Authority *also (which alwaies ought to bee religious, and inuiolable) hath induced mee to confirme, and as it were to binde together, my discourse with their sentences. The which if to some it may seeme faulty, because new and vnaccustomed in our tongue; let them consider whether it be not as seemely in vs to borrow from the* Romanes, *as it was vsuall amongst them to deriue, nay to translate from the* Greekes. [c] Nec aranearum sanè (*as sayth elegantly* Ivstvs Lipsivs) textus ideo melior, quia ex se fila gignunt; nec noster vilior, quia ex alienis libamus vt apes. For neither is the Spiders webbe therfore

[*] *Aduersus Dialogistam.*

the better, becauſe they deriue their threeds from themſelues; nor ours of leſſe value, for that like Bees wee gather out of others. *Wherfore, I haue determined, herein to follow the aduiſe of* EVRIPIDES, *who in his* Bellerophon *ſendeth his youth to learne wiſedome, and enforme themſelues of elder age;*

Ω παῖ, νέων τὸν δρᾶν μὲν ἔντονοι χέρες,
Γνώμαι δ' ἀμείνους εἰσὶ τῶν γεραιτέρων:
Ὁ γὰρ χρ[illegible] δίδαγμα ποικιλώτατον.

that is

Sonne, youthfull hands are abler to performe,
Put wiſedome in thy Elders ſentence ſurer is:
For, much and perfit learning time doth breed.

Farther, to declare vnto you the method, which in the ſearch of theſe affectes of the mind I haue vſed, the reſemblance of a tree ſeemeth not vnfit: * *from whoſe manifold diuided top, into number leſſe branches and ſprigges, it is farre eaſier downward continuing your courſe to find out at the length the roote, then it is from the root to deſcrie all the braunche: becauſe the way downward is direct; vpward, it continually parteth into a number of ſections, wherein is eaſie miſtaking. In the*

*The like is to be obſerued in high wayes, and riuers.

like ſort alſo is it heere. For, whoſoeuer frō the roote of theſe affected actions, which is Pride, ſhal ſpeculate the ſundry meanes, wherby vniuſt fame is ſought for, he ſhall finde a wearyſome, perhaps an endleſſe taske. The contrary is much more eaſie: (which alſo we haue obſerued) that is, by the ſight and diligent animaduerſion of ſuch actions in their ſeuerall kindes, and well weighing the ſolidity of their ſcope, the manner of the performance of them; to find out and diſcouer the true vnfallible ground; and from that found, to eſtabliſh your opiniō, according as the ground, the end, the meanes ſhall be thought to deſerue. Truly, whoſoeuer otherwiſe ſhall by ſpeculation venture to lay open & expreſſe the paſſions of the minde, as they are inwardly intermingled among themſelues, and as outwardly they do commaund theſe actions allotted to their ſeuerall proprieties, ſhall as well point out, and ſhew vs in the Sea, which was the water that from out the Riuer flowed. Laſtly (not to hold you longer then the modeſty of an Epiſtle will beare) I ſhall deſire your indifferency to conſider, not ſo much what in this

ſubiect might haue been ſayd, as to ponder whether ther be any thing in it deliuered, which may ſerue for your vſe. To the learned I intend not this diſcourſe, as beeing aboue bookes; but ſhall euer reſt moſt deſirous to learne of them. The gentler ſort (I hope) will not reiect it, for whoſe vſe & profit, this is. Onely to him I ſhall vtterly account my ſelfe to haue loſt my labour, who in reading of this diſcourſe, ſhall confidently report vnto himſelfe, that he findeth no vſe of remedy thereby, becauſe he needeth none. For the reſt, I ſhall account my ſelfe to haue performed one of HERCVLES *labours, if I can but hereby perſwade, and poſſeſſe the youth of my countrey, fully with this aſſurance, that affected actions and geſtures, whereby they ſtriue to attaine a corrupt fame, are not only not beſeeming them, but are moſt pernicious to themſelues and others: (according vnto that of* SENECA, [f] Nemo ſibi tantùm errat, ſed alijs erroris cauſa & auctor eſt: vt in ſtrage hominum nemo ita cadit, vt non alium in ſe attrahat. No man erreth onely to himſelfe, but is the cauſe and author

[f] De vitâ beatâ, cap. 1.

to others of error: as in a ſlaughter of mē, no man ſo falleth, but that he pulleth down an other vpon him.) *And contrary, (as ther is nothing more noble in it ſelf, or more beſeeming a wiſe man) that they will aſcertain thē ſelues, that thē they ſhalbe moſt pleaſing vnto all, and (which is aboue all) moſt ſecure in themſelues; when they ſhal confirm and beare vp their actions with a naturall and confident proceeding. The which, (I will ſufficiently inſtruct them, not to deſpiſe any; ſo will it aboundantly warrant them, from all contempt in others.*

——Felix quicunque dolore
Alterius, diſces poſſe carere tuo. TIBVLL.

Of Affectation.

THe consent of all Philosophers is, that *Bonum est quod omnia appetunt.* But this desire of good, though it be naturally ingraffed in all creatures that are indewed with life: yet is it most eminent in man; for that hee is created with a reasonable soule, the only true meane to discerne of goodnesse: insomuch, that he neuer coueteth any thing, which is not either essentially good in it selfe, or (at least wise) shadowed o-

Good is desired naturally of all.

uer with goodneſſe; according to that of the *Poët*:

[a] *Maxima pars* ———
Decipimur ſpecie recti.
———*The greateſt part of vs*
Are oft deceiu'd, with th' outward face of right.

a Horat. art. Poetic.

So that, as our chiefe happineſſe conſiſteth in true diſcerning, ſo doth our greateſt miſerie in this miſtaking. And (alas!) the blindnes of mankind is ſuch, that skarce in any thing ſome few finde out the truth, while the reſt wander vp and downe in darkneſſe of errour.

The greateſt good, eaſieſt to be found.

II. And this hath beene the cauſe, why the moſt excellent men of all ages haue ſo painefully endeuored to ſift out the truth, each of them in their ſeuerall ſubiects. But for the moſt part they haue alwayes inſiſted vpon ſuch things, as they conceiued of moſt importance, and

in

in which euerie ſmall errour were not a little daungerous. So that now by the benefit of their labours, without any great difficultie, a man may bee ſufficiently inſtructed in ſuch things, as concerne moſt his knowledge.

III. By the which it ſeemeth they haue inſinuated to vs, that thoſe other matters of leſſe importance, were left for men to ſeeke out and diſcuſſe by their owne induſtrie. Which may ſerue for a ſingular incouragemẽt vnto all beginners; who though they finde themſelues weake and vnable for the ſearch of thoſe higher myſteries, & conſequently are not to entertaine them; (following the coũſell of wiſe *Salomon*,

b *Altiora te ne quæſieris.*
Search not things aboue thy reach.

And fearing leaſt it might hap-

The leſſe requires our greater induſtry.

b Eccl. 3.

pen vnto them as it did to that poore Sheapheard *Tityrus*, who sayth of himselfe:

c Virgil. Eclog. 6.

c *Cùm canerem reges, & prælia,*
Cynthius aurem
Vellit, & admonuit, pastorem Tityre pingues
Pascere oportet oues, deductum dicere carmen.
Whereas I sung of Kings, and bloodie warre,
Apollo *wrung mine eares; ho, not to farre:*
Behoues a sheep-heard, TITYRVS, *to feede*
His fatlings, singing to his slender reede:)

yet neuertheleſſe, they may securely set themselues on worke, with the debating of these other points, which are as it were allotted vnto them. Neither needs they feare, least they want varietie of subiect; but rather bee carefull and vigilant,

that they wade not too farre, and draw more vpon them, then they are able to weelde. For which cause HORACE was so carefull to remember his *Poets*,

Sumite materiam vestris qui Scribitis æquam d Horat. art. poetic.
Viribus, & versate diu, quid ferre recusent,
Quid valeant humeri.——
Chuse æquall matter to your forces, ere you write:
Weigh well what vnder is, and what aboue your might.

The violating of which law by an immoderat desire of writing (according as the *Satyrist* complaineth;

——*Tenet insanabile multos* e Iuuenal sat. 7.
Scribendi cacoëthes, & agro in corde senescit.
Some with a helplesse itch of writing are possest,
Which age cannot consume within their wearied brest.)

hath beene the cauſe, why ſo many haue peruerted the ende of writing; which being directed to the profitable inſtruction or modeſt delight of mankind, hath beene and is ſo frequently abuſed, as well in things of no vſe, as (which is worſe) in friuolous oſtentation of vnſettled witte: which whoſoeuer aymeth at, the end being ſo contemptible, I know not how the meanes can deſerue the ſtile of commendable.

The authors ſubiect.

IV. Wherefore, after ſome deliberation, I haue choſen to treat of that which is oppoſite to the vertue of modeſtie, or to my ſcope more properly to ſpeake, *Moderation* in the morall actions of our life. The which vertue is by ſome defined to be,

f Thom. Aquin. 22. quæſt. 160. artic. 1.

f *Quæ in rebus mediocribus et minimis modum ponit.*

Which

Which doth put a measure in moderate and meane things.

Neither durſt I take vpon mee to write of this whole vice, thereby to enter vpon a compleat treatiſe; but haue choſen out the leaſt parcell thereof, *Affectation*, a vice moſt carefully to bee avoided, becauſe moſt hurtfull; and moſt daungerous becauſe moſt common & vnregarded.

Affectation hurtfull.

V. For if wee ſhall call to memorie the proceeding of the old times (I meane before the light of Grace brought into the worlde) we ſhall find the moſt excellent examples both of *Iuſtice*, *Fortitude*, *Temperance*, & the like vertues atchieued in thoſe times, ſo foully blemiſhed with this ſtaine of oſtentation, as it hath not only depriued thē of all rewarde at the hands of God, but euē quite bereaued thē of their

expected good opinion in the iudiciall, which was the onely scope and ayme of their intentions. The which becauſe this following diſcourſe will ſufficiently declare, it were needleſſe here to confirme by the particularities of examples.

Generall.

VI. As for the generalitie of this vice, whoſoeuer ſhall read ouer both the ancient and moderne hiſtories, examining the Hiſtoriographers iudgements, vpō the moſt highe-ſeeming actions of their times, ſhall aboundantly informe himſelfe, that neither any age, ſex, or condition, no not the moſt learned of all ages, but haue been ſeduced by this vice. As not onely we may rightly conceaue, that it hath beene the cauſe productiue of ſo copious idleneſſe, wherewith the world both is, and hath been euer ſo vnworthily ſtuffed; but alſo as I

may

may say, the principall motiue, that concurred to the performance of their greatest actions.

VII. Yet least any man should imagin this to proceede from some Criticall humour of reprehension in mee (since nothing is so sutable to my yeares and nature, as to admire) I am so farre from condemning the excellent performance of Antiquitie, as that I cannot enough wonder, so great things to haue beene atchieued by so small, as are our naturall meanes, and so few examples of extraordinarie worth to shew themselues in these our later times; the helpes both naturall and diuine being so aboundant. Onely it were religion to me to disagree from the graueſt writers of our Christian world, who haue iudged vaine glorie to haue ouer-ruled the ende of most, if not all, the rareſt

Antiquitie to be reuerenced.

exam-

examples of antiquitie.

Affectation among the Greekes.

VIII. Which to eſtabliſh, let vs but looke vpon the Greekes, the only contemners of the reſt of the World as barbarous, compared to them-ſelues; whom yet wee haue iuſt cauſe to condemne of this vice (moſt eſpecially, if wee ſhall giue credite to the moſt auncient hiſtories, yea to ſome of their owne) for that they not ſo much by their own inuention, as by imitation affected the opinion of extraordinarie wiſedome, and learning; when (doubtfull whether more craftily, or ambitiouſly) ſtealing the ſeedes of diſciplines from the Hebrewes, Chaldæans, Ægyptians and Indians, and ſetting a new gloſſe vpon them, they made ſale of them as of their owne. And afterwarde being diuided into ſeuerall ſectes among themſelues, whileſt

of the same things some conceiue one way, others another; by what straunge and affected kind of proceeding each part did striue to aduaunce their owne opinions? g DEMOCRITVS the *Thracian* Philosopher, who had to name Σοφιάς καὶ γελάσιν, of *Wisedome* and *derider*, perpetually scoffed and laughed at the folly of men; and h HERACLITVS the *Ephesian*, in the opposite humour, continually bewayled the same; Both beyond the true bounds of *decorum:* This latter asseuering, that the body of man was altogether to be neglected, and to bee reputed worse then a dung-hill. And himselfe vehemently sicke of a dropsie, contemning the helpe of Physicians, and all ouer-oynting himselfe with Oxe-dung, after he had set himself against the Sunne, was torne in peeces and deuoured by dogges.

g Diogen. Laertius lib. 9 & Suidas.

h Suidas.

IX. And to omitte other sects,

which

which in this folly were nothing inferiour, wee will only exemplifie in that of the *Cynickes*; of which, [1] ANTISTHENES the *Athenian* being the author, was succeeded by that strangely affectate fellow DIOGENES CANIS. Whose so far remoued actiõs frõ the rest of mankind, that they may the better appeare in their truely affected habite, let vs a little examine the ground of his course, because wee here call him to witnesse, that there hath beene *Affectatiõ* among mankind. SVIDAS reports, that DIOGENES being a man much conuersant in his Common wealth, and ambitious of glorie though false, consulted with APOLLO, by what meanes he might become the first of his Common-wealth. He had answere τὸ παραχαράξειν, *by counterfeiting Coyne:* wherefore corrupting the stampe, and thereupon banished, hee came

In the Cynicke Sect. [1] Suidas.

wande-

wandering vnto *Athens*: where, lighting vpō ANTISTHENES, discoursing against glorie, he thought it his best meanes, by an vnused affectation, to contemne that, which no other way hee could obtaine.

X. VVe will farther call vp one fellow more, who if he were againe to reenter into the world indeede, I doubt not but he would come vpon an other errand. And this shall bee [k] MENIPPVS the *Cynicke*, whose deuise was, to vse a furious kinde of habite: Saying he was sent from below, to ouerlook the sins of men, & that he must go backe down againe to be a messenger of them. He had clapped about him a garment of a rustie darke colour, falling downe to his heeles, girded with a *Persian* girdle, an *Arcadian* cappe ouer his long shaggie lockes, whereon were wouen the twelue signes of the *Zo-*

k Suidas.

diacke,

diacke, Tragicall shooes, a huge beard, with a long ashen staffe in his hand.

In the Iewes.

XI. And to come vnto those men, in whom most the supernaturall and diuine helpes did abound, the ISRAELITES or IEVVES, who by particular prerogatiue aboue all sorts of people were chosen by Almightie God, and appropriated vnto the seruice of his diuine Maiestie; we shall finde, in the whole processe during the time of their being, most frequēt examples of this vice: And (to passe the more ancient) in their later ages most especially, when by their diuision into diuers sectes, they sought the opinion of extraordinarie holinesse & reformation. Among the which sectes, though there were [1] manie (needlesse to bee rehearsed) much taxed with this vice; yet the PHARI-

[1] Nic. Serrarius Triharres. cap. iv.

SES & SADVCES so much & often reprehēded by our *Sauiour Christ* in the new[m] *Testamēt* for their excesse in this, shal suffice to proue the vniuersalitie of *Affectation*. The which may euidently appeare by that which Hee so often reprehendeth them for; as being *Hypocritæ, stulti, inanis gloriæ cupidi, foris parentes, sepulchra dealbata, pleni hypocrisi, & iniquitate: Hypocrites, fools, greedy of vaine glory, outwardly appearing, whited Sepulchers, full of hypocrisie and wickednesse:* & such like wherewith the EVANGELISTES are so copiously filled.

m Mat. 6.

XII. But among *Christians* perhaps (who haue an higher ende then temporall glorie to ayme at, & a perfecter rule then humane reason to direct themselues by) this vice will not be found. And no doubt it wold be so indeed, if al, that professe CHRIST, followed his doctrine &

Among Christians.

exam-

example. Yet is it so far from this, that not onely the Histories, and written discourses of all *Christian* times, but also (in this age of ours) our dayly experience doth cleerely represent before our eyes, the continuall surfets of this infection. And to omitte, that in the *Christian* Cõmonwealth, this hath likewise beene the cause of so many diuisions, Sects and Heresies, and as it were the only grounde, whereon they were erected (as of those of ARIVS, PELAGIVS, MANICHÆVS and the like) whereunto no man with reason can disagree: Among the rest also of the best reformed (excepting alwayes some rarely noble and heroicall vertues) though this vice hath not produced so foule effects; yet in matters not impeaching their faith, as were the morall actions of their life, in many of them it hath verie euidently ap-

n Baron. Anal. Eccle-siast.

peared,

peared, and in others more ſparingly; ſo that ſcarce any haue eſcaped free from this diſeaſe, at the leaſt in their outwarde actions and geſtures.

XIII. And, although theſe things may ſeeme rather the effects of vaine glorie (which is a larger ſubiect) than of *Affectation*, wherof I purpoſe now to treate, excluding the other as too generall for my intent; yet are wee not to imagine the cauſe to haue beene without the effect. And of vaine glorie one of the greateſt effects (as wee ſhall hereafter ſhew) is *Affectation*: which in moſt (as hath beene ſayd) hath ouerruled and corrupted the ende of their beſt actions; which in themſelues conſidered were verie noble and praiſe-worthie. Laſtly, this vice of *Affectatiõ* hath hitherto ſo much poſſeſſed all mankind,

that it DIOGENES wold but take the paines to seeke for men voide and cleare of this infection, as hee did, when with his light and Lanterne at noone-day, he so busily romed about the Citie of *Athens* to finde a man (the Citie being repleniſhed with so many thousands) I feare hee would bee benighted with that toyleſome exerciſe, before probabilitie of attaining his deſire.

The Authors methode.

XIV. Wherefore, hauing deliberated to diſcourſe of the moſt familiar and domeſticall enimie of mankind, the vice of *Affectation*, before we come vnto the particulars thereof, it ſhall not bee from the purpoſe to ſhew how, from whēce, and by what meanes it riſeth, increaſeth, and is diſtinguiſhed from other vices. The which being before hand declared, will both ſerve

in a readier and more perfect methode to determine of the parts, as alſo the better informe you of our purpoſe, and the reſtrictions, which wee haue propoſed vnto our ſelues in the handling of this ſubiecte. The which wee ſhall the better explicate, if wee præmitte ſomething of glorie.

XV. *Glorie* therefore, or *Fame* (about the which all this treatiſe is conuerſant) is twofolde, *exteriour*, or *interiour*. For, a man is either prayſed by another, who conceiues him prayſe worthie, by outward meanes, as by ſpeach, writing, and the like; or by inwarde æſtimation, though it breake not out into exteriour ſignes: whereof excellently SENECA the Philoſopher ſayth, o *Cùm dicimus aliquem laude dignum non verba illi benigna hominum, ſed iudicia promittimus.*

Glorie internall, and externall.

o Seneca. Lib. i. Epi. cii.

When we affirme any man to be worthie of prayſe, we promiſe him not the fauourable ſpeech, but iudgement of men: Inſinuating thereby, that the beſt glorie conſiſteth in the interiour iudgement of him, who within himſelfe deemeth a man prayſe-worthie. And againe, diſputing againſt the obiection made by the *Logicians* in contempt of glorie, who argued *Praiſe to be nothing but a voice, and a voice to be nothing at all:* But (ſayth he) P*Cùm dicunt claritatem laudem eſſe bonorum, à bonis redditam: iam non ad vocem referunt, ſed ad ſententiam. When they cal good Eſtimation the prayſe of the good, giuen them by ſuch: they referre it not to their words, but to their opinion.*

P Ibidem.

True glorie only from the good.

XVI. Neither conſiſteth this true fame in the opinion of all, but only of the good; as preſuppoſed

to apprehende a thing glorious, vpon iudgement, not passion. Wherupon excellently SENECA putteth a diuersitie betwixt *glorie* and *good estimation*, so called by vs; by him, *Claritas*. For (saith he) *Gloria multorum iudiciis constat, claritas bonorum. Glorie consisteth in the iudgements of many, good estimation in that of the good.* For, the estimation of the multitude is founded but vpon their most inconstant opinion, gathered vpon vncertaine ground: as, either by errour in iudgment at the sight of some acte which they erroniously deemed prayse-worthie; or by a naturall incitement to admire that, which themselues cannot conceiue; or by the most common and obvious reason of the multitude, for companie of others. Of this glorie it seemeth that [a] SENECA else where speaketh, tearming it *Vanum & vo-*

[a] Epist. Cxiii.

latile quiddam auráque mobilius. Vaine and fleeting, and more moueable then the winde. Whereon, I meruaile, that any man can bee found so fond, as to builde his greatest actions; the foundation being so vaine and so vnsure.

How commendable.

XVII. But this other estimation of the good, as it is a thing not to be sought for, except for a farther intention of good (in which respect it is vertuous and laudable, as heereafter wee will prooue) so, as it is a shadowe of vertue, which doth accompanie euen the vnwilling, it is a thing of excellent purpose, and most commendable, both in him, vnto whome it is attributed, and in him, who giueth it. For, how noble a thing (in truth) is it for him that hath the prayse, to haue performed so braue thinges worthie thereof; and to

him,

him, who hath beſtowed that commendation, euen by that act to haue purchaſed the opinion in others both of Iuſtice and wiſedome? Of Iuſtice (I ſay) for hauing iuſtly yeelded that honour where it was due; of wiſedome, for that he was able to diſcerne, whereunto of right it did belong. Which honour then, hee, who hath deſerued it, doth wholly tranſport vnto him, that gaue it; when by his own immoderate acknowledgement, he renders himſelfe vnworthy of it; the commendation of the well beſtowing it ſtill remaining in the other. For, as the Hennes, incontinently as they haue laied their egges, begin to cackle, and by the noyſe giue notice thereof, whereby they are ſtraight waies taken away: euen ſo it is with theſe ſelfe-commenders, who then loſe the eſtimation due to their actions,

when they beginne to attribute vnto themselues.

Moderately to bee admitted.

XIIX. The true estimation, therefore, which consisteth in the iudgement of the good (whereof is that of the *Tragicke, Magnificum esse laudari à laudato viro: That it is a worthie thing to bee praised, by a praise-deseruing man*) is that also whereof the Poet speaketh, *Honos alit artes. Honour nourisheth artes:* not that talkeatiue prayse, which is the destroyer of Arts. For, what hath so much corrupted eloquence, and those studies, which are imploied to the eare, as popular applause? But, the opinion and sentence of the good, whereunto a man, conscious vnto himselfe but of a right intēt, hath submitted his indeauors, is that, which giueth encouragement and vpholding vnto Arts. The which, according vnto SENECA,

some-

ſometimes precedeth, ſometimes followeth vs. q *Quemadmodum* (ſaith hee) *aliquando vmbra antecedit, aliquando ſequitur: ita gloria aliquando ante nos eſt, viſendamque ſe præbet, aliquando in auerſo eſt; maiorque quo ſerior, vbi inuidia ſeceſſit. Euen as ſometime the ſhadow goeth before, ſometime followeth: ſo glorie ſometimes is before vs, and giueth it ſelfe to be ſeene; ſometime it is behinde; and the later the greater, when enuie hath giuen place.* And, if wee would condemne that man, who trauailing on a ſerious iourney, ſhould therefore turne backe, becauſe he would haue his ſhadow before him, and vpon ſo triuolous and vaine occaſion bee diuerted from his neceſſarie marke; How much more ridiculouſly (trow you) ſhould hee doe, who ſhould fondly loſe the effect of his endeuours, for that his way were not

q Epiſt. LXXIX.

lightned

lightned before by the blazing torch of mens prayses? A shadow, the more the bodie pursueth it, the faster it flieth away: so by how much more the action of vertue striues for glorie, by so much the more it wanteth it.

Desire, an hinderance of glorie.

XIX. Therefore, it is ingrafted in the mindes of men, to doe vnto none so little honour, as vnto those, whom they know to be most desirous of it. When [r] ALEXANDER, hauing ouercome DARIVS, wrote vnto the *Gracians* to be reputed as a God; the *Lacedæmonians* made this decree: * *Quoniam* ALEXANDER *Deus vult esse, Deus esto. Since* ALEXANDER *will needs be a God, a God be he*; wittily reiecting his insolency. [t] MENECRATES * the Physician was so greedy of glorie, that hee called himselfe IVPITER: whom PHI-

r Aelian var. histor. lib. 2. *ἐπειδὴ Ἀλέξανδρος βούλεται θεὸς εἶναι, ἔστω θεός.*

s Idem. lib. 8.

* *Menecrates* ad Philippū Macedonē scribens, tali vsus est exordio: *Philippo Menecrates Iupiter salutem.* Ad ea respondens *Philippus*, sic orsus est; *Philippus Menecrati sanitatem.* Aelian. lib. 2 de var. histo.

LIP, King of *Macedon*, hauing inuited vnto a ſumptuous feaſt, commanded him a table by himſelfe, a *cenſer to bee placed before him, and perfumes to bee offered: by the which hee verie much delighted: at the length being vrged with hunger, whileſt (the reſt banqueting) there was nothing brought vnto him; deluded and confounded in the ende, he was faine to riſe from the table. So much did thoſe auncients perceiue, thoſe, who immoderately ſought their owne glorie, to bee worthily depriued thereof. Whence† ANTISTHENES, knowing PLATO to be exceeding inſolent therein, viſiting him once in his ſickeneſſe, and chauncing to behold a veſſell wherein hee had vomited, *Bilem* (inquit) *hic video, faſtum non video. Choler I heere ſee, pride I ſee none.*

* Acerra, Suidas ſaith, by ſome called an aultar, by others a cup wherein they did ſacrifice wine.

† Bruſon. lib. 6. cap. 5.

The vse of glorie.

XX. This honour, which (vnsought for) doth vnseparably follow the good actions euen of the vnwilling, is by PLATO defined to be, [u] *Bonorum largitio, propter virtutis officium : æstimatio ac dignitas virtute acquisita : figura venerationis, conseruatio dignitatis. A gift of the good, for the function of vertue : an estimation and worth acquired by vertue: a forme of worshippe, a conseruation of dignitie.* The which definition, common in the rest to many others, yeeldeth farther something more, concerning the vse, which is to bee made of this glorie; in the last clause, *conseruatio dignitatis*. For, it being a thing indifferent, in it selfe considered, ought to haue a good end and scope, to be made of valew. Wherfore, as the pleasure, which we see to bee conioined vnto our naturall actions; which by SENECA is ex-

[u] Speusippus de platonicis definitionibus.

ſed to be, x *Humilis res & puſilla, & in medio habenda prætio, communis cum multis animantibus, ad quam minima & contemptiſsima aduolãt: A baſe and ſmall matter, and to bee meanely eſteemed of, common with many beaſtes, vnto which the leaſt and moſt contemptible thinges doe haſten.* And namely that, which doth accompanie the refection of our bodies, is not idly, or ſuperfluouſly annexed vnto that action: but for an incitement to the better performance thereof, in which perhaps otherwiſe men would be more careleſſe and ſlowe, than the health and well ordered ſtate of their bodies would allow: So likewiſe this honour, which in this ſo rare harmonie, is appointed to waite on the good endeuours of men, ſerueth for a prouoking & encouragement vnto vs to ſtriue to put in practiſe thoſe vertues, which are by vs

x Senec. Epiſt. cccliii.

eſtee-

esteemed so faire and honourable.

XXI. And to make farther vse of this renowne: to the aduancement of vertue (which onely ought to be the ende, whereunto it is directed) this *Conseruatio dignitatis* is a principall meane: which is otherwise recommended vnto vs by SALOMON, where he saith,

y Proverb. 22. y *Melius est bonum nomen, quam diuitiæ multæ.*

Better is a good name, than many riches.

As, whē a man endeuoureth to plāt a good opinion of himselfe in the vnderstanding of other men, in hope that his farther actiōs, wherby he proposeth vnto himself to bring more good vnto mankinde, shall bee of the more authoritie, and the sooner entertained by them, by confirmation of that, which is past; according to that of CICERO,

Vehe-

2 *Vehementer (autem) amor multitudinis commouetur ipsâ famâ. The Affection of the multitude is much wonne by fame.* Not that this glory is any thing in it selfe considered, or addeth ought to him, that hath it; as not standing in need therof: as saith the same C i c. a *Honore & gloriâ & benevolentiâ ciuium fortasse non omnes egent: & tamẽ cui hæc suppetunt, adiuuant aliquantum cùm ad cætera, tum ad amicitias comparandas, &c. Perhaps all need not honor, glorie, and their Citizens good will: and yet being had, they helpe somewhat, as to other things, so likewise to the procuring of friendship.* But when it helpeth *ad virtutem exercendam*, then is it of valew, dignified by the intention, whereto it is directed, For, a wise man desireth no glorie as a solace or reward of vertue, or embraceth it accompanying his actiõs; but, for that the

2 2°. Officiorum,

a Ibidem.

æsti-

æstimation of his honestie & goodnesse, begetteth him occasion of farther good: Since much more easily and sweetly may a man bee behoofefull vnto those, who doe honour and loue him, then if he be suspected or ill esteemed; because hee then cannot vse his vertue, nor force them, who flye his benefite.

When selfe-praise is beseeming.

XXII. But, if for other causes also a man may be desirous of glorie, or commende himselfe; hee is diligently before hand to consider and throughly to examine what they bee; to the ende, that deuiting vanitie and importunitie, he let not therfore those escape, which are requisite and profitable. Lawfully therefore may one prayse himselfe, when thereby hee may blowe ouer an accusation or slaunder imposed vpon him; as verie

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commendablie did PERICLES: b *Ac mihi quidem vos irascimini, ei viro, qui nemini vestrûm cedo vel peritia rerum, vel elocutione intellectarum, vel amore patriæ, vel pecuniæ despicientia. And you are angrie with mee, who yeeld to none of you, either in knowledge, or eloquence, or in the loue of my Coûtrie, or the contempt of money.* For, here he not onely auoyded the vice of arrogancie or ostentation by speaking so highly of himselfe, but most nobly declared the height of his mind, euen oppressing enuie by this, that it would not suffer it selfe to bee deiected and broken downe. SCIPIO AFRICANVS, after his returne to *Rome*, was by some of his enemies cited into iudgement (and a day appointed him, by the two TRIBVNES of the people) for that, hauing beene corrupted by bribes, hee had

b Plutarch de sui laude

betrayed the common profite. He, contemning his accuſers, when the iudgement by chaunce had lighted on that day, which was the anniuerſarie of his Carthaginian victorie; ſending (before) the ſolemne pomp into the Capitoll, to ſacrifice, Himſelfe went into iudgement in his feſtiuall habite; not baſely arrayed (as the manner of the guiltie was) to moue commiſeration; each man wondring at his high erected mind, through the inwarde affiance of his conſcience. And beginning to ſpeake, hee made no mention of his crime; ſtill remembring the braue actes of his fore-paſſed life, the daungers, the famous victories, which hee had obtained for his Common-wealth, with much both grauitie of ſpeach, and pleaſure of thoſe which heard him. But, whē as his oration arriued at the euerſion of *Carthage*, then moſt of all

vſing amplification, after hee had ſtirred vp both himſelfe and the auditorie: [a] *Hoc (inquit) die (Quirites) cum Carthaginenſibus feliciter pugnaui, quos tantoperè formidaſtis, antea; itaque hinc in Capitolium eo ſacrificatum. Vos quoque, quotquot amatis patriam, ite mecum, & diis gratias agite. This day, O Romanes, I fought that happie battaile with them of* Carthage, *whome you ſo greatly feared, before. Wherefore hence I goe into the Capitoll, to ſacrifice. You alſo, ſo many as loue your Countrie, come with mee, and yeeld thankes vnto the Gods.* Hauing thus ſaid, hee went vp into the Capitoll (contemning the iudgement) the people thronging after him; euen the Iudges for that time applauding him, and wiſhing him all happineſſe.

a Appianus Alex. de bellis Syriacis.

XXIII. Theſe kinds of ſelfe

commending, are not onely odious or distasteful vnto the hearers, but they are praysed, extolled, and by a secret and inward instincte admired, so as they bee true and constant. No lesse worthily (in my vnderstanding) did EPAMINONDAS, the chiefe Magistrate of the *Bœotians*, behaue himselfe. For he being sent by the *Thebanes* with his colleague PELOPIDAS and some others, with forces, in the aide of the *Arcadians* and *Messenians*, against the *Lacedæmonians*; and againe, the warre not being finished according to his desire, vpon some discontents being sent for home; could not brooke to haue the occasion of so noble a victorie taken from him, which hee had alreadie foredoomed and in his heart made his owne. Wherefore they refused for the space of sixe moneths to deliuer ouer their armie

vnto their appointed ſucceſſours, vntill they had ouerthrowen the *Lacedæmonians* ſtrength, and reſtored the *Arcadians*; and that by the authority of EPAMINONDAS, who promiſed, that acte ſhould bee dangerleſſe vnto them. But being returned home, and each of them cited on a capitall crime (for it was death by the [a] lawes, to retaine the commaunde of the Armie in the time of anothers iuriſdiction) they eſcaped iudgement, not ſo much by the commiſeration of the iudges, as by laying the fault vppon their Colleague EPAMINONDAS, forwarned by him, and euen then taking the matter vpon himſelfe. VVho laſt of all beeing called into iudgement, I confeſſe (ſaide hee) my ſelfe beyonde the appointed time by the lawes to haue retained the commaunde of the armye; and

[a] Βουλήτιον, Legem hãc appellabant Thebani. Plutarch. in vita Pelop.

to haue forced my associats, whom you haue absolued, to doe the same. Neither refuse I to vndergoe the lawfull sentence of death: this one thing for my past deserts I require, that you will cause to bee engrauen this Epitaph vpō my Toombe; [b] *Hîc situs est, qui partâ in* Leuctris *victoriâ, ciues suos, quibus antea vel pilei Laconici erant terribiles, duxit sub ipsa Spartæ mœnia: hunc patria mulctauit capite, quod minùs legum rationem habuerit, quàm vtilitatis publicæ. Heere is hee situated, who hauing obtained the victorie of* Leuctra, *carried his Countrie-men, whome before euen the* Laconian *cappes did affright, vnder the wals of* Sparta: *Him his Countrie put to death, for that hee had lesse respect vnto the lawes, than to the publike weale.* This sayd, hee arose out of his chaire; and, descending, offered his bodie vnto him that would

b Appian Alex. ibid.

lead

lead him. But the Iudges, inwardly touched with this exprobration, and amazed at the ſtrange kinde of defence, and withall ſtriken into an awfull reuerence of the offender, without euer asking * voyces they haſtily withdrew themſelues from out the Court. What could be ſpoken more worthily? what more noblie? Neuer did any man deſerue more honour by diſ-eſteeming himſelfe, then hee by honouring.

* Ne calculis quidem poſtulatis. Cræci olim calculis ſententias & ſuffragia colligebant; candidis abſolutionem, nigris condemnationem ſignificantibus.

XXIV. Wherefore, theſe ſelfe-prayſes are alwaies diſallowable, but when they are boulſtered vp by ſome occaſion or cauſe which may change their qualitie, & make them honeſt. For, the *Romanes*, who did euer repine at CICERO, when hee was hearde ſo vnceſſantly to number vp his braue actes and benefits to the common-

wealth, against CATILINES did not onely commend & extoll SCIPIO for committing the like, but also (as before) led him crowned into the Capitoll, and were attendants at his sacrifice: Because that he, without vrgent necessitie, but onely by an immoderate desire of glorie, vaunted himselfe; this other, by the perill hee was in, was not more secured from enuie, then admired. For, as those, who in walking raise themselues, set vp their neckes, stretch out their armes, vse warlike gestures; are by vs deseruingly discommended, as stolide and vaine persons; and againe are praysed as much if in fence or fight they awake themselues: So hee, who in aduerse fortune striues to right himselfe, from baseneſſe and miserie, setting himselfe on highe by the remembraunce of his worth, seemes not vnto vs trou-

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bleſome or arrogant, but greate and inuincible. Laſtly, it is a thing moſt neceſſarie vnto the ſocietie of men, to conſerue and keepe a mans reputation ſpotteleſſe. Whence ANAXANDRIDAS, hearing one ſaye, that æſtimation was hurtfull, and he happie that laboured leaſt to purchaſe glorie: by that reaſon of thine (ſaide hee) the wicked ſhall bee moſt happie. a *Quî enim ſacrilegus, aut iniuſtè agens, famam curaret? For howe would a ſacrilegious and wicked perſon reſpecte his fame?* Whereby it appeareth that if wee will not allow honeſt fame amongſt men, as a meſſenger which may enforme each man of anothers deſerte, wee ſhall deſtroye and vtterlie ſubuerte all humane conuerſation; Since wee haue noe other meanes to vnderſtand

a Plutarch. in Laconic. apotheg.

of those wee knowe not, but by the eare.

Prayse admitted without danger.

XXV. Furthermore, if vpon any occasion it shall so fall out, that a man shall bee a hearer of his owne prayses, it shall fayrely become him, to correct them, if immoderate; to extenuate them, if due; to order them, if not drawne from true places: as, if hee bee extolled for his learning, for riches, for power; hee shall modestly desire his commender to consider whether hee bee good, whether harmelesse, whether profitable. Heereby hee shall manifestly discouer, that hee more desires to bee prayse-worthie, then praysed; as most seemely did [b] PERICLES. For, when his friends commended him at his death, recounting his high offices, his great power, his fortunate and noble

b Plutarch de suilande.

victo-

victories, how many goodly Cities, conquered by his valour, hee would leaue vnto the *Athenians:* hee, a little raising himselfe, reprehended them, in that they reckoned vp those prayses, which were common to many, and more of fortune then vertue; omitting the greatest, most fayer, and peculiar commendation of himselfe; that neuer any *Athenian* by him had beene occasioned to mourne. For, enuie without difficultie granteth the lesser, where out of modestie the greater is refused: and true prayse is neuer withdrawen from him, who admitteth not that, which is false and vaine.

The abuse of glorie.

XXVI. Thus hauing shewed the true & commendable vse of glorie, there resteth now to declare the abuse thereof, commonly called *vaine glorie*; and how *Affectation*

is deriued from thence; before we discourse of the seuerall braunches thereof. First therefore, as *Pride*, the deepe roote of all these excessiue disorders, is *an inordinate appetite of ones owne excellencie:* So is *vaine glorie*, *an immoderate desire of mens prayse for this excellencie*. By this desire wee are often transported to embrace the shadowe, not the vertue; that is, not so much to bee incited by the goodnesse of our actions, as by the fame. Against this fond passion, the fable of IXION seemes verie aptly to haue beene composed. For, as he, in stead of IVNO whome hee loued, is saide to haue beene deluded by a cloude of her resemblance; and of that to haue begotten the CENTAVRES: so, who embraceth vaine-glorie as the image of vertue, doth execute nothing sincere-

Vaine glorie.

ly,

ly, nothing agreeable in it ſelfe, but is deluded by ſtraunge affects and perturbations. [a] ALEXANDER, the great, commaunded a famous Archer, taken among the *Indians*, to ſhewe his Arte, for that hee was ſaide to ſhoote thorough a Ring: and, becauſe he refuſed to ſhoote, hee commaunded him to bee ſlayne. Being aſked the cauſe of his refuſall by thoſe which ledde him; hee aunſwered, that for want and intermiſſion of practiſe, hee was much afraide hee ſhould haue miſſed. Which beeing related vnto ALEXANDER, hee was ſet free and rewarded; the King remaining aſtoniſhed, that hee would chuſe rather to dye, then to bee reputed vnworthie the fame that went of him. In the which acte, though I can not chuſe but admire his ſpirit, worthy

[a] Bapt. Fulg. lib. 8

to haue beene conioyned with a better iudgement; yet neither can I chuſe, but acknowledge the ſtrange power of this commanding paſſiō, which herein compeld him to preferre the loſſe of ſo meane and abiect a fame, before the eſſentiall good of his life. For, that this idle fame (which hath his eſſence but in the blaſts of mens mouthes) is inferiour farre vnto our liues, it is moſt euident; ſince wee are abſolute maſters, and Lords ouer our reputatiō, of our liues wee are not. Then onely are our liues inferiour much vnto our honours, when the breach of our æſtimation is præiudicial to the publike weale, or the due execution of vertue; omitting all ſupernaturall reference. But if any vice doe ſeduce and blinde the vnderſtanding of men, this moſt of all: the which was pleaſauntly, reſembled by that olde fable, whereof a PLVTARCH

a In vita Agi. & Cleom.

ma-

maketh mention; of the Serpent, whose tayle is said sometime to haue mutined against the head, & required that by turnes it also might haue the conduct and leading of the rest of the bodie, and not alwayes bee forced to followe the direction of the head. Wherfore, hauing obtained the præcedence, it came to passe, that it (moouing without sight) did greeuously offende, and drewe the head also through many streights, forced against the order of nature to followe a deafe and blind guide.

XXVII. An other sorte of this contagious infection is, when for the good parts, which are indeede within vs, wee seeke vnlimited prayse, more than of right is due vnto vs; endeauouring to raise in men a greater estimation of our worth, then they iudge to belong

vnto

vnto vs: & this, two wayes; either inwardly not exceeding our desire or appetite, which is *Ambition of glorie*; or, externally applying our speaches, gestures and actions thereunto: and then is it *Iactantia*, *Boasting*, or *bragging*. Both are built vpon deceipt, which wee frame out of the ignorãce of men, by striuing to corrupt their iudgements, and make them mis-esteeme and prize our good aboue the true valewe thereof. The which as it riseth from their mistaking, so is it abated and ouerthrowen by their bettering. For, the desires of those who obliquely beside vertue haue sought after fame, lightly haue beene reuersed, and come to no effect. ALEXANDER, CÆSAR, AVGVSTVS, CONSTANTINE, and such like other worthie Princes, of whose names Cities were built, and moneths denominated,

Ambition of glorie.

Boasting.

con-

continue vntill this day famous and vnuiolated; CALIGVLA, [a]NERO, [b]COMMODVS, ADRIANVS, and such others who did the like, meerely in hope thereby to eterniſe their fame, becauſe they ſought not to obtaine it by vertue, are forgotten and aboliſhed. The [c]later part whereof is ſo much the more odious then the former, by how much the greedineſſe of glorie is more violent, breaking into actiõ, than is the onely internall deſire. This exceſſe the great Oratour, CICERO, liuely hath paterned in himſelfe in his Epiſtle vnto L. LVCEIVS a Roman Citizen; wherin hee earneſtly entreateth and coniureth him, that he would write the hiſtorie of L. CATELINE by it ſelfe, ſeuerally from other workes, therby to propagate his fame. Neither abſtained hee to require him that hee would attribute ſome thing

a Nero Aprilem menſem Neronem nominauit.
b Commodus Carthaginem Commodiana appellari iuſſit.
c Iactantia.

to friendshippe, by enlarging and amplifying the historie, and publish it in his life time, that hee liuing might enioy some part of his fame: Not doubting to accuse himself also of this notable absurditie, adding, *Qui semel verecundiæ fines transierit, eum benè & gnauiter oportet esse impudentem. Who once hath transgressed the bonds of modestie, he must become throughly impudent.* What could be more absurd in him, who by his admirable eloquence, and worthy labours for his Commonwealth had alreadie purchased a neuer dying honour? How fouly this excesse blindeth the eyes euen of the wisest!

Lib. 5. Fam. Epist. Epist. 69.

XXIIX. The next degree is, when wee couet the glorie of men for good things; but those either being quite absent from vs, or, not being indeede in such quantitie within vs, as wee would haue them

imagined to bee. This we call *Ostentation*. The which by the Platonickes is defined to bee [d] *Affectio quæ sibi vendicat ea bona quæ minimè adsunt. An affection, by which we challenge to our selues that good which is not in vs.* And this is that Pride, wherof speaketh S. AVGVSTINE. [e] *Superbia non est aliud, nisi deserto secreto conscientiæ, foris videri velle, quod non est. Pride is nothing else, but hauing forsaken the secret of our conscience, to desire to seem outwardly that, which inwardly we are not.* And this is twofolde. For we either may wish and desire, men to holde that opinion of vs, which wee in truth deserue nor, neither striue to procure by action: as, when wee would by others bee esteemed valiant, though wee bee fearefull and cowardly, and neuer gaue token of our courage; which is *Arrogancie*: or, wee

d Speusippus, de Plat. defi.

e Lib. 2, de Gen. contra Manichæos. c. 5.

Ostentation.

Arrogancie.

may endeuour by deſſembling and counterfaiting to impoſe vpon men to ſeeme that, whereof wee inwardly finde want in our ſelues, by what outwarde meanes ſoeuer; this wee properly call *Hypocriſie*. The vice of *arrogance* was elegantly expreſſed by SOCRATES. If any man (ſaide hee) in the Theater ſhould bid the Tanners to riſe, they onely would ariſe; ſo likewiſe the blackeſmithes, weauers, ſhoomakers and ſuch like: but if he requeſt the wiſe & iuſt to ſtād vp, thē euerie man rayſeth himſelfe, becauſe all of them will ſeeme ſo to be. What a lightneſſe, what a vanitie of our mindes is this, that leauing our owne conſcience, wee ſhould follow others opinion, and that falſe and fained? MARTIAL prettily carpeth SEMPRONIVS TVCCA for this fault, in that *Epigram*,

Hypocriſie.

a Lib. 7. epigram. 35

a *Coſmicos eſſe tibi*, SEMPRONI

Tvc-

TVCCA, *videris:*
Cosmica, SEMPRONI, *tam mala, quàm bona sunt.*
SEMPRONI TVCCA, *to thy selfe thou seemest*
To bee a worldling; TVCCA, *hee is madde*
Who knowes not seuerall sorts to be of them,
Some worldlings to be good, more to be bad.

who, by the imitation of SOCRATES, boasted himselfe to bee a Citizen of the world. The *Poët* vsing the word *Cosmicus* somewhat more largely, merrily sheweth him, of worldlings to bee more bad, than good. *Hypocrisie* is most apparent in the *Scribes* and *Pharises*, whose goodnesse and iustice was meerely hypocriticall: becausse it either consisted onely in externall righteousnesse, neglecting the interiour and true iustice of the heart; or that,

prepoſterous and maymed, becauſe they exactly obſerued the leſſe things, and neglected the greater; or elſe, in fained onely and counterfaited, becauſe it was in deede rather a verball then reall obſeruation. Of this Pride ſpeaketh S. HYEROME. b *Multa deformior illa eſt ſuperbia, quæ ſub quibuſdam humilitatis ſignis latet. Neſcio enim quomodo turpiora ſunt vitia, quæ virtutum ſpecie celantur. Much more deformed is that pride, which is concealed vnder the vaile of humilitie. For I know not how thoſe vices are fouler, which vnder the reſemblance of vertue are hidden.* Much like vnto the apples, which growe about the dead Sea (where, of old, ſtood *Sodoma* and *Gomorrha*) as many authors do affirme, which in bigneſſe and colour are verie beautifull, ſeeming to be ſolide and ripe; but ſo ſoone as they are handled

b Lib. 2. Epiſt. 22. circa finem.

and

and neuer ſo ſoftly preſſed, they reſolue into an vnpleaſant and offenſiue vapour; as infectious for the ſmell, as they were gratefull to the ſight. [a] DIOGENES pleaſantly called the *Muſicians* in queſtion, for that they ſtroue to accord in exacte harmony the ſtringes of their harpe; whileſt their inward affectiõs and their outwarde actions were at variance. And he wondered at the *Grammarians*, that ſo buſily enquired and ſought after the miſeries and misfortunes of VLISSES, viterly ignoraunt of their owne.

a Laert. lib. 6.

XXIX. The laſt and moſt abſurde part of this vice is, when euen for the badde and ſtraunge thinges which are in vs, wee affecte and ſeeke after glorie, the which in themſelues conſidered

were dishonourable. This wee call *Affectation*, the parcell of vaine glorie whereof wee purpose to discourse. The which, in the entrance, wee placed as the opposite vice to the vertue of *Modestie*. Let vs therfore for the better vnderstanding thereof examine what this *Modesty* is. It is by the *Platonickes* defined to bee, [b] *Voluntaria ad id quod optimum iudicatur concessio: in gestu corporis compositio. A voluntary yeelding vnto that which is best: a good and orderly composition in our outwarde behauiour*. By [c] IVSTVS LIPSIVS, *Ratione temperatus, nec actione exsultans de se suisque sensus. An opinion of ones selfe & things belonging to him, tempered with reason, and not exceeding in action*. The which definitions, in the whole, suite not to my subiect; in parte they doe. For in that of PLATO, leauing the first clause,

Modestie.

b Speusippus in Platonicis definitionibus.

c Politicorum lib. 11. cap. xv.

as *Modeſtie* is the later, *in geſtu corporis compoſitio*, it is the oppoſite vertue vnto *Affectation*. To that of LIPSIVS, in ſtead *of ſenſus*, we for our purpoſe would put *modus*: Becauſe we in this diſcourſe intend not to treat of the inwarde conceite of excellencie, but when that interiour immoderate apprehenſion, ioyned to deſire ſerceth out into action, therby to attaine the prayſe of men. Neither this alſo, but in part, when it becommeth *Affectation*; which wee define to bee, *An immoderate ſtrife to attaine glorie by inordinate and ſtrange courſes*. Vnto which vice the oppoſed vertue is that *Modeſtie*, *Quæ ponit modum in rebus minimis & mediocribus. Which doth put a meaſure in the leaſt and meaneſt things*. For, but by the way, I intend not to ſpeake of *Affectatiõ* in greater vices, but onely as in the leſſer & more moderate. Neither doth this

Affectation defined.

trea-

treatiſe admitte it as oppoſite to *Chriſtian* vertue, but to morall.

[a]XXX. ANDRONICVS did ſet downe three parts of *Modeſtie*. *Ordinationem*, vnto the which the direction of thinges to bee done did belong; as, what was to bee done, what to bee omitted, and by what meanes: *Ornatum*, by the which a man doth that which hee doth, as beſt becommeth, according vnto the rules of *Decorum*: *Auſteritatem*, by the which in communications and meetings, a man doth retaine a requiſite maturitie. Whereof the ſecond, which is *Ornatus*, is moſt properly oppoſed againſt *Affectation*, as it is committed in ſtrange thinges: both beeing referred vnto action. This *ornatus* (as it ſeemeth) is that which Count BALDASSAR CASTILIO in his *Courtier* calleth

[a]D. Thom. Aquin. 22. quæſt. 143. artic. 1. *Modeſtie three-fold.*

Caſtilio *his Reckoſſenes.*

Sprez.

Sprezzatura, and his Interpreter *Reckleſneſſe*: Whereunto hee placeth *Curioſitie*, as antagoniſt. The which, whileſt hee goeth about to eſtabliſh as a naturall vertue, he maketh it *Oſtentation*. For, hauing diſcourſed a great while, that the grace of ſeemely ordering of our actions is then moſt commendable and admired, when it is done with a diſgracing kinde of Arte to couer Arte withall; making outward ſhew, as if that which indeed is Arte, were in vs a naturall habit of ſo doing: he addeth this reaſon; Becauſe (ſaith hee) that this *Reckleſneſſe*, beſide that it is the true fountaine from the which all grace ſpringeth, it bringeth with it alſo an other ornament, which accompanyinge any deede that a man doth, howe little ſoeuer it bee, doth not onely by and by open the knowledge of him that doth it,

but alſo many times maketh it to be eſteemed much more in effect then it is; becauſe it imprinteth in the mindes of the lookers on an opinion, that whoſo can ſo ſlightly doe well, hath a great deale more knowledge, then indeede hee hath: and if hee would applie his ſtudie and diligence vnto that, which he doth, hee might performe it much better: which to confirme, hee exemplifieth in a Muſician, who if in ſinging hee route out but a plaine note ending in a double relliſe with a ſweet tune, ſo eaſily that a man would iudge hee did it at a venture, in that point alone hee doth men to vnderſtand, that his knowledge is farre greater then it is indeed. The which what it may be in a Courtier I know not; but in a Countrie man I ſhould iudge it *Oſtentation*: whereby (as is before) a man doth ſeeke immoderate prayſe for much excellencie,

whereof yet there is but ſome parte in himſelfe. For although it be truely the greateſt and moſt commendable point, yea without the which no mã arriueth to the height of Art, to make when occaſion ſerueth, that ſeeme natural in vs, which is indeed artificiall; and of excellent purpoſe rightly ordered: as when a man is to perſwade, if hee then vſe Art in his oration, deliuering it notwithſtanding as naturall; when otherwiſe if it were vnderſtood by the auditorie to be artificial, it would be ſuſpected and of the leſſe effect: yet is it made baſe and diſcommendable, when it is leueled at vaine glorie. The reaſon is, becauſe in that, wee ſtriue to *ſeeme*, not to *bee*. This *ornatus* therfore by the which a man doth as beſt becommeth him, is then verie laudable, when it is *actio non contra* but (as ſayth SENECA) [a] *Secundũ naturam: not againſt, but according*

a Epiſt. v.

to

to nature. For, as the Philosophers agree, *Natura est causa ordinis, ac proportionis. Nature is the cause of order, and proportion.* And then do wee sinne against Nature, when we leuel our intentions at some thing, which is contrarie to the due & wel composed order of things.

Affectation diuided.

XXXI. All *Affectation* is either *inuentiue* or *imitatiue*, committed in things (according as our definition is) *bad* or *strange*; and that by *men*, or *woemen*. Which diuision, although wee might haue disposed it into many others, it shal suffice to reduce the most of the principall heades of this subiecte thereunto. For although we might haue distributed it into the most essentiall qualities thereof, wherein consisteth the inwarde being, or, into those through the which it worketh outwardly, as namely in-

to *actions*, *gesture*, *speech*: yet, leauing this as too materiall a diuisiõ, which would cause repetition (the same thinges for the most part agreeing vnto all of them) we haue thought good to follow that other; since *Inuention* and *Imitation* seem to be the most intrinsecall parts of *Affectation*. First, therefore whosoeuer affectedly striueth after glory, either hee buildeth the foundation of it vpon some meane by him inuented, which hee esteemeth a capable subiect thereof; or else, hauing before experienced that effect to haue followed some other mens indeuours, hee striueth, by imitating of the like, to vndergoe the same fortune. In the which course hee seemeth most to transgresse the bounds of *Modesty*, who imployeth the greatest studie, and vseth most labour and diligence to attaine the same:

which

which, whether in bee in *imitation* or *inuention*, it is not easie to iudge.

The more labour, the greater vice.

XXXII. For in either of them there appeareth much industrie and care to be placed, whether wee intend our wittes to excogitate some new deuise, or take the paines to note and obserue the like courses of other men tending vnto our endes; and what effectes haue subsequuted those endeuours. Both of them require an intensiue witte, great industrie, with much assiduitie. For among those things, which wee purpose vnto our selues to do, some things are incident vnto the subiect propounded, some vnto our selues; others, neither in the subiect nor our selues, but are from without otherwise fetched in. Whereof, that seemeth to bee much more vneasie, which is in the matter, not in vs; be-

cause to the knowledge of that which is without vs, wee employ all the faculties which are within vs: to the vnderstanding of something within vs, wee aide our selues but with the remnant. Vnto *Inuention*, therefore, which is in the subiect, so long, we labour with all the powers and discourse of our mindes, vntill wee come into the knowledge thereof: *Imitation* busieth onely that part, which is either alone or most properly susceptiue of the action wee propound. Wherefore there seemeth to bee most place for *Imitatiõ*, where there is least for the witte: for that *Inuention* participateth more of the vnderstanding, *Imitation* of the will.

Inuention hath more of the witte, Imitation of the will.

XXXIII. Againe, *Imitation* is nothing else but a picture, vnto the which we conforme our purposes: and, in a picture some thinges

are like, others vnlike, none are the ſame. For wee either imitate the like that others haue acted before vs, but with change, and in an other habit; or elſe, to the reſemblance of ſome one action we frame an other quite diuerſe, which yet probablie is capable of the like effect that the other, which is that wee ſpeaks ayme at by *Imitation*: the ſame no man imitateth, or if hee doe, not without the note of ſtupiditie, as vnto whome verie fitly will bee applied that of [a] LVCIANVS, that then we ſhall excellently well haue imitated DEMOSTHENES, when wee haue written out one of his Orations: and beeing deprehended into ſo manifeſt abſurditie, wee haue moued laughter, like vnto ÆSOPES chough, vnto all the beholders.

[a] In Toxar. Tragœdo.

XXXIIII. Farther, the

counterfeit according vnto ARISTOTLE, is alwayes ſhort of the thing counterfaited: as in the Arte of Painting it is moſt euident, for that no man can equalize in his picture the grace and maieſtie which the life doth carrie; neither by a counterfeite, though neuer ſo exactly done, can he frame ſo true a reſemblaunce as that hath of the life. Wherein, *Imitation* of the ſame, commeth alwayes ſhorte of the *Inuention:* for if by Arte (as we may) wee ſometimes exceede our patterne, wee therein leaue to imitate, and fall to *Inuention*; ſince *Inuention* imitated can neuer bee equaled.

Imitation alwayes ſhort of inuention.

XXXV. The perill alſo whereunto *Inuention* is expoſed, addeth a farther difficultie thereunto, then it doth to *Imitation*. For it is both eaſier for vs in a thing

Inuention the more dangerous,

of our inuention to ouerſhoote our ſelues, then if we inſiſt on the example of an other, in the which pattern we may more perſpicuouſly ſee what maketh either for, or againſt vs, according as the ſaying is. *Facile eſt inuentis addere: it is eaſie to adde vnto things inuented:* and is much the leſſe pitied, or rather becommeth more ridiculous, eſpecially when it is euill applied. How much was that vnheard of deuiſe of [a] PAVSANIAS exploded? who demanding of HERMOCLES, by what meanes he might ſuddenly become for euer famous; had anſwere, By killing ſome worthie and eminent man, with whoſe glorie perpetually his would be had in the like memorie. VVherefore he ſuddenly ſlew King PHILIP: neither miſſed hee of his purpoſe; becauſe through the vertue of the King he is alwaies remembred for a paricide. What

a Max. lib. 8 *Pauſanias.*

shall I say of HEROSTRATVS, who resolued to burn the most magnificent [b] Temple of DIANA at *Ephesus*, accounted among the wonders of the World; that by the destroying of so admirable a work, his name might bee recorded through the world? which prodigious purpose of his hee confessed vpon the racke. Whose memorie excellently well the *Ephesians* by a decree had vtterly abolished; were it not that THEOPOMPVS had comprised him in his historie. Or else, allured by the noueltie of the thing, to the end to seeme more knowing then the rest, had counterfaited that name, as VAL. MAXIMVS seemeth to suspect.

Herostratus.

[b] Ibidem.

XXXVI. Neither is it easie to discerne whether C. CALIGVLA did declare as immoderate desire of vaine glory, & by as foule

C. Caligula.

meanes as any of these, [a] who being repleniſhed with all kinde of wickedneſſe, and well knowing that he could not make his name liue by vertue, of the which he was an vtter enemie; he openly was wont to wiſh, that ſome great euill or miſchaunce might happen in his time, of the which men might talk a great while, as vnder AVGVSTVS did the VARIAN ſlaughter; and in the time of TIBERIVS the ruin of the Theater at *Fidenæ*, by the which two & twẽty thouſand people were oppreſſed and ſlaine. Did he not make choice of an excellent plat-forme, to build his fame vpõ? Againe, what is more knowne then that familiar and vſuall cuſtome of moſt of the great Potentates of thoſe times, whereby by the example one of the other they attributed vnto thẽſelues diuine honours, aſſuming the titles of a Godhead, erecting Idols of, and Tem-

[a] Bapt. Fulg. lib. 8.

ples

ples to themselues.

XXXVII. Truely, as it is hard to discerne in these extreames, by whether of thē a man is most violently drawne, because that he seemeth most to exceede, who placeth most study & industrie in either of thē; so if of themselues they be considered, we shal find *Inuentiō* to ouerballance the other; perhaps because it is vnderstood, that who striues to excogitate new & strāge wayes vnto glorie, out of an immoderate desire, seekes to leaue the common path, & to preuent the rest. The actions of either compared together, wil yeeld easie matter of iudgement.

Inuention the more immoderate.

XXXIIX. But this inordinate & violēt desire is seldom incidēt but to greatest spirits; who, being naturally framed to great things, can brooke no mean: but if by vertue they cānot satisfie their vnsatiable appetite

The greatest spirits most subiect to this excesse.

of glorie, they endeuour to bring it to paſſe by any meanes; which is the cauſe that they fall, through want of vertue, into ſo ſtrange enormities, More deſirous to do, then circumſpect what to do: euen ſometimes with perill of their liues and fortunes and what elſe mought bee deare vnto them, aduenturing to doe that, which afterward turneth moſt of all to their diſhonour; ſo little warie, through the inward paſſion, that poſſeſſeth them. Oftententimes not pondering the action they committe, driuen headlong by a reſtleſſe appetite of glorie, they take any meane, the next at hand, though neuer ſo ignominious (ſo long as it carrie a ſhew of greatnes) thereunto.

a Iudith. 1. & 3. *Nabucodonoſor.*

XXXIX. a NABVCODONOSOR King of the *Aſſyrians* commanded diuine honours to be

done

done vnto the Idole, which he caused to be made, of himselfe; and not content with that, gaue order vnto HOLOFERNES to raze and abolish all the *Gods* of the earth, that himselfe alone might bee held as a *God*. [b] ALEXANDER the *great*, worthie otherwise of the greatest honour, most insolently did ouershoote himselfe; when, ouercome by the *Persian* pompe & excesse, lothing his Countrie rites, hee entertained their customes & habit: and disdayning his owne father King PHILIP, hee made himselfe the sonne of IVPITER HAMMON. [c] M. ANTONIVS, when beeing *Triumuir* hee sported at *Athens*, willed himselfe to bee called DIONISIVS: and vaunting to be descended from HERCVLES, ouer his armour he wore a Lions skinne: And vpon the Theater hee erected a bridge pinned together and adorned

b Val.Max. lib. 9. *Plutarch.* in eius vita. *Alexander.*

c Dion. & Athen. lib. 4. c. 7. et. 1. suasoriarum *Plutarch.* in Ant.

ned with greene trees, as was wont to bee done in the rites of BACCHVS, wherin were hung drums, flutes, and such like DYONISICAL play-games; himselfe from the morning vntill the euen drinking and quaffing with his friends, in the sight of the *Gracians*. But of these examples all histories are full. Will you some of those, who haue found out yet more strange wayes to this glorie?

XL. Looke vpon [d] HANNON of *Carthage*, who arriued to that madnesse, that by this new deuise hee sought to bee esteemed among men as a *God*. For, hauing kept, & with much industrie taught in an obscure place, diuers Birdes imitating an humane voice to say, HANNON *is a God*: when hee had brought them to perfection, hee set them at libertie; hoping by that meanes to gaine the reputation

d Aelian. lib. 12. *Hannon.*

of a *God-head*, in the common people. But the little birdes returning vnto their olde and wonted tunes, deluded his vaine and foolish expectation.

XLI. But, no man can so well describe this humour, as C. CALIGVLA hath paterned it in himselfe; all his life being nothing els but an image and a representatiō therof.[a] He, hearing by chāce some Kings, who of dutie had come vnto the Citie, striuing and disputing among themselues at supper, about the noblenesse of their birth, cried out, [b] Εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω, εἷς βασιλεύς. Neither wanted there much, but that he would haue assumed a Diadem, & haue conuerted the Principalitie, into the form of a kingdom. But admonished, that he far exceeded the cōdition either of a Prince or king, he forthwith began to attribute vnto himselfe diuine honour.

C. Caligula.

a Dion. Xiphilinus. et Suetonius.

b Ilid. α. Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη, εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω, εἷς βασιλεύς.

And

And giuing order to haue the Images & ſtatuaes of the *Gods* famous for religion, or Arte, to be brought vnto him (among the which was that of IVPITER OLYMPICVS) that ſtriking off the heads, he might put thereon his owne: hee enlarged his Pallace as farre as the market place, hauing conuerted the Temple of CASTOR and POLLVX into his porch; and was wont to ſet himſelfe in the middeſt betwixt the two brethren, to bee adored with them, by the paſſers by: many ſaluting him by the name of IVPITER PATIALIS. He erected a peculiar Temple, Prieſts, and moſt exquiſite hoſtes and ſacrifices vnto his deitie. In his Temple ſtood an Idole of fine golde of himſelfe: which was dayly clothed and adorned with the like garmẽts, as he thẽ vſed. The cheefe prieſthood whereof, was ſought after by the greateſt

of

of the *Romanes*, both by fauour and bribes. The oblations were Pecockes, *Numidian* phesants, *Ginney* or *Turkie* Cockes, and the like, which were euerie day offered: in the night time he duely inuited the full and shining Moone to his embracements. Sometime hee talked with IVPITER CAPITOLINVS, now whispering, into eithers eares, then alowde, and not without chiding. For there was heard the voice of threatning: Εἰς γαῖναν Δαναῶν περαῶ σε: Vntill being intreated, as he reported, and moreouer inuited into societie, hee built a bridge vpon the Temple of AVGVSTVS, ioyning the *Capitoll* and his Palace. And straight wayes that he mought bee the neerer, hee laide the foundation of a new house in the Court of the Capitoll. Hee thundred also and lightened by the meanes of strange engines: & as often as any

thunder

thunder lighted on the earth, hee, to the contrarie, threw vp ſtones; and was wont to repeat at euerie throwe that of HOMER, ἢ μ' ἀπόλλυθι, ἢ ἐγὼ σέ. *Either kill thou mee, or I thee.* He threw downe the Temple of CASTOR and POLLVX which was in the market, & contriued the entrance of his Pallace between the two ſtatuaes; that (as hee ſaide) hee might haue CASTOR and POLLVX for his Porters. Then boaſted he himſelfe to haue beene crowned by *Victorie:* And threatned farther that he would caſt forth IVPITER out of the Citie, for that hee ſometimes by ſending raine did annoy and perturbe his playes, and publike ſhewes the which hee ſet forth.

a Determining afterward by ſtrong hand to aduance his *Statua* in the Temple of *Hieruſalem*, and being in vaine diſſwaded frō that attempt, by the Preſident of *Syria* PETRO-

a *Ioſephus*, lib. 18. c. 11. & lib. 9 cap. 1. Antiquitat.

NIVS, in the middeſt of his enterprize he died. [b] Hee was not onely called the new DYONISIVS, but alſo vſed the *Dyoniſicall* attire; & in that, hee publikely gaue the lawes. Loe here a moſt perfect mirrour of *Affectatiõ*, nothing not ſtrange, nothing not wicked; all intended, and directed to vaine glorie, al immoderate, & beyond the ordinarie leuell.

b Athenæus. lib. 4. Cap. 7

XLII. Neither was the Emperour IVLIAN, ſurnamed the *Apoſtata*, inferiour vnto any in this vice. [c] For, hauing remoued the Image of Chriſt erected by the HÆMORRHOVSSA at *Cæſarea Philippi*, he erected there his own *Statua*, to the ende to aſcribe vnto himſelfe the vertue of certain ſtrange herbs, which did growe vnderneath the place, whereby many diſeaſes were dayly cured: But fier from Heauen cut his *Statua* in ſunder about the breaſt, and threw downe the necke

lian.

c Sozomenus. lib. 5. cap. 20.

and

and the head, with such violence, that the face was deepely fixed in the earth. And d HELIOGABALVS, sitting in a Chariot, wherein Lions drewe, commaunded himself to be called CYBELES; ioyning Tygres to his Chariot, he was named BACCHVS, vnto whom perhaps through his excessiue humour of drinking hee was something more like.

d Fulgos. lib. 9. Capit. 5. Heliogabalus.

XLIII. What other do these excesses, and most insolent & extrauagant courses bewray, but a most contemptible insufficiencie endeuoured to be patched vp by as foule meanes? Truely vailed with so ill chosen clothing, as that it is much the more disgraced by the hew thereof. No couer is of thickenes sufficient to shadowe or hide such faining. The more it concealeth it, the more it appeareth: not vnlike

Affectatiō the more it is cōcealed, the more it appeareth.

to

to a glaſſe, which placed before any thing, maketh it ſeeme the greater. Which they, notwithſtanding, through their too much ſelfe-loue and liking, thinke not onely to render their actiõs good, but glorieus: being placed in that height of pride, as they imagine good and commendable whatſoeuer is performed by them. Elſe would they not, with ſo reſtleſſe indeuour, haue ſought and beaten out ſuch by and vntracted wayes to this marke.

XLIV. Such is the blindnes of that paſſion, as where it once entereth, it ſo dazeleth the eyes of him, whom it poſſeſſeth, that all others light ſeemes darkeneſſe vnto him. For who is hee, that once hauing giuen himſelfe ouer to this ſlily inſinuating humour, is not perſwaded all excellencie to bee compriſed in himſelfe? that is not moſt

Blindeth others light.

delighted with his owne doings? to whom other mens actions, though of the same qualitie and perhappes better performed, seeme not tedious & much inferior, cõpared vnto his? What enormities hath not this desire of singularitie driuen men vnto?

XLV. a ADRIAN the Emperour couetous beyonde all measure, to bee esteemed to excell all other men in the knowledge of Artes and disciplines, deeming it not enoughe to beare the name of AVGVSTVS, and himself to haue written the historie of his braue actes & gouernement: if hee discouered any man to haue the like skill with him in all sciences (in the which in truth hee verie much excelled) by whom there might be danger, least hee were ouercome, through enuie and too greedy a desire of singularitie, hee caused him to bee killed. Among the which was APOLLO-

Adrian.
a Dion. & Bapt.. Fulg. lib. 8.

DORVS the Architect, a man beyond compariſon excellent in that Art; for that, the Emperour hauing ſent vnto him the plat-forme of a great worke, the which he had contriued, he by efficacious reaſõs had proued, that in ſome places it was to bee corrected. [a]Hee indeuoured to ouerthrow FAVORINVS GALLVS, & DIONYSIVS MILESIVS the Sophiſters; their followers hee vtterly deſtroyed. [b]When DIOMEDES & VLYSSES by mutuall induſtrie had ſtolen the fatall PALLADIVM forth of *Troy*; VLYSSES, by the night as they went, compriſing how himſelfe might carrie away the whole praiſe of that enterprize, lifted vp his ſworde at DIOMEDES going before & carrying the PALLADIVM, meaning to haue cleaued his head in ſunder: but hee, by the light of the Moone, eſpying the ſhadow of the ſworde, and quickely

a Dion. Suidas.

b Suidas. & Zenodotus. & Eraſmus in adag.

apprehending his danger, withdrew himselfe from the stroake; and binding the hands of VLYSSES forced him to goe before, sometimes laying him ouer the backe with the flatte side of the sworde. Hence the prouerbe, *Diomedea necessitas*.

XLVI. And[c] NERO, the Emperour so much did striue to bee reputed the Prince of Musiciãs, that he not onely commaunded all the Statuaes & Images of the most excellent men of that Art to bee defaced, and his owne to bee erected in lieu of them: but also put many of them vnderhand to death, by emulation of their fame: Thinking that then all the glorie would arise vnto himselfe, when there should bee none left, whose skill and knowledge should claime a part with him therin. A strange course to fame, when

[c] Suetonius. & Bapt. Fulg. lib. 8. Nero.

out of the ignorance of others, wee will desire to seeme somewhat: a most wicked & ignominious, when wee are the suppressers, nay, the murtherers of Science, thereby to obtrude our owne.

XLVII. And if wee shall worthily condemn that Marchant, who contriueth and practiseth the losse, and casting away of an others marchandize, thereby to make the better sale of his owne; how much more shall we thinke those euen vnworthie the name of men, who blowen vp with selfe-esteeming of their owne stuffe, will not sticke to vent it, euen by the death of so many much worthier men then themselues? yet haue wee too often beheld it. And in whom more, nay in whome else, but in those, who haue held the places ordayned to bee the rewarders of vertue, abusing euen

that authority which shold cherish, to offend; which should preserue, to destroy? Those that ought to haue beene the fathers, wee haue seene the murtherers.

XLVIII. But what maruel wee, if these men, themselues secure, haue practised the ouerthrow of others; when wee haue knowne of those, who to purchase this fond glorie, haue attempted and performed as hainous and outragious misdeedes as any of them, euen such whereby themselues were sure to perish; and haue much preferred the false opinion of glorie, euē before their deerest liues? Wherein to omitte more ancient, wee will onely exemplyfie in one or two actes, committed in the memorie of our fathers. [a] GABRINVS FVNDVLVS the tyrant of *Cremona*, being by a witty sleight taken prisoner by PHILIPPVS Vi-

False glorie preferred before the good of life.

a Fulgo. lib. 9. cap. 11. & Iouius Philip. *Gabinus Fundulus.*

CECOMES Duke of *Myllane*, when viewing in the market place of *Myllan* the engine for his execution, he was commaunded to lay vnder it his necke, and certaine religious Prieſts as the manner is, comforting him, and exhorting that according to Chriſtian diſcipline he would endeuour to take the ende of his life with a ſettled and patient minde, crauing of God pardon & forgiueneſſe for his paſſed enormities and miſdeedes, ſince he was ſo ſuddainly to render an account therof, with an angrie countenance and wreſted eyes; Leaue of (ſayd hee) to bee thus troubleſome vnto mee, who ſo vnworthily and perfidiouſly haue beene betrayed: for I am ſo farre from ſorrowing for any thing, which by the right of warre I haue committed, that I do exceedingly greeue, that I had not to the immortall fame of ſo braue an acte,

throwen headlõg down the *Pope* & *Emperour* frõ the top of my Tower. For, some few yeares before, hauing entertained IOHN the XXIII. Pp. and SIGISMVNDE the Emperour, and inuited them to the sight of a most pleasant and rare prospect from the toppe of his famous tower; his execrable thoughts inwardly stirring him, he had once determined to cast them ouer into the vnder market place. By which hee gaue to vnderstand, that he was most of all sorrie, that he had omitted so faire an occasion to haue prolonged the date of his fame vppon the earth: This desire so vehemently possessing him, that he euen at his death determined, since the opportunitie of the fact was passed, at the least to make the best vse hee could thereof, by the rehearsing it. Fearing belike and loath, that the memorie of so braue an act should dye

con-

concealed with him.

XLIX. [a] HIERONYMVS OLGIATVS one of the fower which murthered GALEATIVS SFORCIA Duke of *Myllan*, in prison & in exquisite tortures, wrote a confession wherein hee declared himselfe to haue beene drawen into that action for the onely desire of glorie and a great name; wherewith hee said himselfe to haue beene incensed, whilest hee yet a child in the schooles heard repeated the braue deedes of the auncients; hauing beene enkindled most of all thereunto by his Master COLA MONTANVS, who perpetually praysed and extolled BRVTVS for the killing of CÆSAR. The Notarie, who assisted at his death, hath left recorded that when his soule was euen readie to depart the communion of his bodie, vnder the executioners

a Fulgos. lib. 8. cap. 15 & Egnatius eodem. *Hieronymus Olgiatus.*

hands

hands, who was ripping vppe his breaſt, with ſomewhat a blunt edged knife, hee vttered theſe wordes in Latine; *Collige te Hieronyme, ſtabit vetus memoria facti. Mors acerba, fama perpetua. Comfort thy ſelfe* HIEROM, *the memorie of this fact will long remaine. A ſharpe death, the fame euerlaſting*; Euen at his laſt gaſpe reuiuing, and adding new ſpirits vnto himſelfe, by the conſideration of his after-fame. Poore man, not conſidering that he who liues to a badreport, dies to true glorie; which is the good opinion of the iudicious and vertuous. A ſtrãge motiue to a reaſonable ſoule, to make that the meane to fame, which being bad in it ſelfe, cannot but produce the like effectes. *Omnia rerum omnium* (ſayth SENECA) *ſi obſeruentur, indicia ſunt. There are ſignes of all things, if they bee well obſerued.*

Affectation ſheweth an euill affected minde.

L. And in verie deed, what other do theſe moſt ſtrange and inſolent courſes, but betray a moſt corrupted conſtitution of the mind? For, as the diſeaſes of the body do manifeſt thẽſelues by outward ſignes, as by the indiſpoſitions thereof, ſuddain heats or coldes, too much colour or palenes, quaking, ſhiuering & the like; ſo likewiſe the exteriour actions, being bad & enormous, doe infallibly declare an il diſpoſed & affected mind. Theſe actiõs therfore (the effects of our inward diſpoſitiõs) proceeding frõ the *iudgement* & *will*, do plainly argue a notable infirmity in either of thẽ. For whoſoeuer arriue to this degree of *Pride* which we call *Affectatiõ*, to endeuour to attain prayſe and glorie for bad & ſtrange things; which glorie being the effecte of thoſe actiõs, is the ſcope & only end of their labours: either they cõmit that which they imagin to be good,

and

and to produce the like effectes; or that they knowe to be bad, and the effect to be such: or else, the cause being vnderstood to be bad, they imagine the effect (which is the glorie thereof arising) to bee good; and the better to establish that effecte, will not sticke to iustifie the cause.

A corrupted iudgement.

LI. In *the first* who doth not perceiue a notorious error in iudgement, which is so farre ledde astray from right reason, as to esteeme good euill, and euill good? The which errour may proceede from *Ignorance*, or *Custome*: The one the mother, the other the nurse thereof. This *Ignorance* is either *necessarie*, or *voluntarie*. Whereof the one deserueth pittie, the other blame. For the *necessarie* may happen vnto vs or by the weakenesse of the iudiciall powers not able to dis-

cerne

cerne aright between things, or for want of manuring and bettering of them by education, ſtudie, and the like, which in a right conceipt doth merite compaſſion. The *voluntarie* is not without fault, as excellently ſaith S. [a] BERNARD: *Multa ſcienda neſciuntur, aut ſciendi incuriâ, aut diſcendi deſidiâ, aut inquirendi verecundiâ: & quidem huiuſmodi ignorantia non habet excuſationem. Many thinges which wee ought to knowe, we knowe not, either by a careleſneſſe of knowing, or by ſlothfulneſſe to learne, or by baſhfulneſſe to enquire: and ſurely this kinde of ignoraunce cannot bee excuſed.*

a In Epiſt.

Voluntarie ignorance.

LII. Since by all theſe meanes wee not onely againſt Nature and our own dignitie, wilfully endeuour to continue ignorance in our reaſonable portion (whereby wee are

made

made different from the brute beasts;) thereby as much as is in vs, rendering our selues like vnto them: but also most ridiculously & shamefully thinke our selues thereby freed from the dutie wee owe vnto God; yea and enlarge our scope to sinne. Which the same *Author* well noted when he said, b *Frustra sibi de infirmitate vel ignorantia blandiuntur, qui vt liberius peccent, libenter ignorant, vel infirmantur. In vaine they flatter themselues with their infirmitie or ignorance, who are wittingly ignorant and infirme, that they maye the freelier sinne.* What shall wee thinke of this, when euen the heathen Philosophers did so much condemne that ignorance, whereby wee are rendered vnsufficient to the right & vertuous esteeming of the actions of our life: as a SENECA doubted not to say, *Tolerabilior est pœna, viuere non*

b Super. Ia gra. humili.

a In prouerb.

posse,

posse, quàm nescire. It is a more sufferable paine, to bee depriued of life, then not to knowe how to liue. And PLVTARCH in his disputation, whether the euill affections of the bodie or minde were the worse, thus saith: *Itaque medici hoc volunt, vt ne agrotet homo: si agrotet, ne hoc nesciat. Wherefore the Physicians doe desire that a man bee not sicke: if hee be, that he be not ignorãt thereof.*

LIII. But ignorance (saith he) doth happen almost vnto all the diseases of the mind. For neither the wilde, the lecherous, nor the vniust, will thinke they sin: some imagine they doe brauely thereby. No man euer gaue the name of health vnto an ague; or called the consumption, a good constitution of the bodie; or the gout the swiftnesse of the feete; or a pale colour redde. The impatience of the minde many haue

Ignorance in the euill affectes of the minde.

vouch-

vouchsafed the title of fortitude; and rearmed loue, friendshippe; enuie, good æmulation; feare, a warie heedfulnesse. Thence commeth it to passe, that who are bodily sicke seeke incontinently the helpe of the Physiciã, each for the disease whereby they find themselues aggreeued. Those which are infected in minde shunne and deuite the Philosophers; for that euen in those things wherein they offende, they conceaue themselues to doe most vprightly.

LIV. Excellently therefore sayed EPICVRVS[b] *Initium est salutis notitia peccati. The knowledge of our sinne is the beginning of our remedie.* *Nam* (sayth[c] SENECA) *qui peccare se nescit, corrigi nõ vult. deprehendas te oportet, antequam emendes. For who knoweth not himselfe to erre, will not bee corrected.*

b Seneca. Epist. XXVIII.

c Ibidem.

It behoueth thee to discern thy selfe, before thou canst amend. For hee will hardly finde remedie, who is ignorant of his infirmitie. How much the farther off is hee, if hee not so much be ignorant thereof, as esteeme it good, nay & glorie therin? a *Quidam* (saith hee) *vitijs gloriantur. Tu existimas aliquid de remedio cogitare, qui mala sua, virtutum loco numerant? Some do glorie in their vices. Thinkest thou those, to consider of remedie, who reckon their euils in the number of vertues?* b MARSILIVS FICINVS the great *Platonicke*, speaking against this ignorance, and exhorting men to cast it off, thus saith; *In primis oportet vestem, quam circumfers, exuere, indumentum insciti*æ*, pravitatis indumentum, corruptionis vinculum, velamen opacum, viuã mortem, sensitiuum cadauer, sepulchrũ circumuectile, domesticum demique*

a Seneca. Epist. XXVIII.

b Com. in Mercurij Trismegist: Pimand.

furem, qui dum blanaitur, odit; dum odit, inuidet; huiusmodi est, quo circumtegeris, vmbraculum inimicum. First thou must leaue off that veile, which thou carriest about, the vesture of vnskilfulnesse, the cloathing of leudnesse, the bond of corruption, a duskish couering, a liuing death, a sensible carcasse, a portable sepulcher, and a househould theefe, who whilest he flattereth, hateth; whilest hee hateth, hee enuieth; such is this noysome shadow wherewith thou art couered.

LV. Excellently well describing it, by those similitudes, whereof no man infected with this euill, but findeth the effects in himselfe. The true shadow, vnder the which, who can shroud himselfe, deemeth any thing lawful that being done, he supposes couered thereby. But he farther addeth. c *Ad seipsum te deorsũ raptat,*

c Ibidem.

ne

ne fortè conſpiciens veritatis decorem, atq; proximũ bonum, huius oderis prauitatẽ: neue huius inſidias, quas in te aſsiduè machinatur, aliquando præſentias, hoc aciem interiorem ſenſuũ hebetat, & obtundit: craſſâ illam materiâ ſuffocat, abominabili faſtidioſâq; ebriat voluptate, ne audias vnquam, neuè perſpicias, ea quæ iure & audienda ſunt, & in primis inſpicienda. It forceth thee downward to it ſelfe, leaſt perchance eſpying the comelineſſe of truth, and the good at hãd, thou ſhouldeſt loath the deformitie of this: and leſt thou ſhouldeſt diſcouer the wiles wherein it ſeeketh to entrap thee, it blunteth the ſharpneſſe of the interiour ſenſes: and choaking it with a thick matter, it ouercometh it with an abominable & loathing pleaſure, to the end that thou maiſt neuer hear, nor perceiue, thoſe things which ought principally to be heard, & chiefely looked into.

Affectation by ignorance according to the excellencie of, driueth vs to great or smaller excesses.

LVI. But this ignorance whether it be by a necessarie defect, or by a voluntarie negligence, wherby wee fall into *Affectation*, thinking it good, or through the delight which wee conceaue of the glorie springing thereout, not willing to know it for other: either according vnto the place it possesseth in our mindes, or the forces thereof, drieth vs vnto great and foule actions, or vnto straunge and more moderate: according vnto that of [a] MARSILIVS. *Ignorantia & confidentia sui, nata quidem potentiam, terribilis est: si verò sit impotens, ridicula fit. Ignorance and confidence of ones selfe hauing attained power, is terrible: but if it be impotent, it becommeth ridiculous.*

a Mar. Fici. in commēt. in Platon. Philœb.

Errour in iudgment confirmed by custome.

LVII. *The other* way by the which this errour in iudgemēt may proceede, or rather is maintained &

nurtu-

nurtured, is by *Custome:* Which most assuredly not onely causeth *Ignorance*, but begetteth *Confidence*, where it throughly taketh hold. For as sayth S. BASIL, *Mos longo tempore confirmatus, vim quodammodo obtinet naturæ. Custome confirmed by time, obtaineth as it were the force of another nature.* There is no man, who in something or other hath not experienced the strength thereof in himselfe. It so farre seduceth the vnderstanding of man, that euen that, which at the first was knowen assuredly to bee naught, being by weakenesse committed, is by it made doubtfull, so soone as we but desire that it were otherwise thē it is indeede; afterward it becommeth probable, at the length not to bee doubted of. And this not onely in the smaller things of lesse importance, but in the greatest, and of most moment. As most true-

ly noted[b] SENECA when he said; *Tunc (autem) consummata est infelicitas, vbi turpia non solũ delectant, sed etiam placent: & desinit esse remedio locus, vbi quæ fuerant vitia, mores sunt.* The is our vnhappinesse compleat, when foule things not onely delight, but also please vs: and there leaueth to be place for remedy, where those things which were hitherto knowen vices, are become our customes. And S. AVGVSTINE the like; [c] *Peccata, quamuis magna et horrenda, cùm in consuetudinem venerint, aut parua esse aut nulla creduntur: vsq; adeo vt non solùm non occultanda, verum etiam prædicanda, diffamandáque videantur. Sinnes, although great and excessiue, when as they fall into custome, are esteemed as little, or none: so farre forth, that they seeme not onely not to bee concealed, but to bee published and diuulged abroade.*

b Epist. XXXIX.

c In Enchi. cap. 82.

LIIX. For what is there in truth, which helped with a self-pleasing desire it mought bee so, and continuallie put in practise as if it were so, being neuer so enormious, doth not at length appeare iustifiable and good? Euen that which wee before did hate, wee see by custome not onely made tolerable, but pleasaunt and expetible. How much more that, whervnto wee are carried by delight? Truely, in some the forces thereof are such and so efficacious, as it both peruerteth their iudgement, making that seeme good, that either before was knowen to bee bad or doubtfull; and oftentimes possesseth their vnderstanding with such a fained assurednes, as it remooueth all question and suspicion of euill, not so much as suffering them to enter into consideration, whether it be other thē good: according vnto

Custome of euill peruerteth the best iudgements.

that of [a]CICERO, *Consuetudo peccandi, maleficii remouet dubitationem. Custome of sinning, remoueth all doubt of the misdeed.* A misery, from the which, if wee bee once throughly engaged therein, wee can hardly, and but with much industrie set our selues free & at libertie. Such is the strength thereof, such the force. [b]*Grauissimum* (saith SENECA) *est imperium consuetudinis. The command of custome is most vnsufferable.* For, [c] *cum culpa in vsum venerit, ei iam animus etiamsi appetat, debilius resistit: quia quot vicibus praua frequentationis astringitur, quasi tot vinculis ad mentem ligatur. When a fault is become a custome, our mind although it neuer so much desire it, is weaker to the resistance: because by howe many times it hath been the oftener repeated, by so many bonds it is fettered to the minde.*

a Ad Heren.

b In Prouerb.

c D. Gregor. in moral. lib. 4.

LIX. And

LIX. And though we many times neuer ſo earneſtly deſire to ſet our ſelues free from the vices which infect vs; yet being oppreſſed by the heauie burthen of them, and ſhut vp in the priſon of ill cuſtome, we verie hardly can get out of our ſelues, & attaine our libertie: Since, where (of our own accord) we ſo long haue ſtayed, we are at length detayned violently, when wee are moſt willing to goe foorth. Therfore it is much more eaſie not to admit vices in the beginning, then to ouer-rule them being confirmed by cuſtome. [d] *In primis finibus* (ſaith SENECA) *hoſtis arcendus eſt. Nam cùm intrauit, & portis ſe intulit, modum à captiuis non capit. The enemie is to be kept off in the frontiers. For when he is once entred, and brought himſelfe within the gates, hee will hardly bee auerruled by his captiues.* [e] And againe. *Facilius eſt*

Hardly ouercome.

d Sen. de Ira. lib. 1. c. 8.

e Ibidem. cap. 7.

exclu-

excludere pernicioſa, quàm regere; & non admittere, quàm admiſſa moderari. Nam cùm ſe in poſſeſſione poſuerunt, potentiora rectore ſunt, nec recidi ſe minuiue patiuntur. It is eaſier to exclude hurtfull things, than to rule them; and not to admitte, than to moderate them admitted. For, when they haue put themſelues in poſſeſſion, they are more powerfull than their ruler, neither will they permitte themſelues to bee leſſened or cut off.

Affectation grounded on euill for it ſelfe.

LX. *The ſecond* way, whereby (as was before declared) wee mought affecte, was when wee committe thinges which wee aſſuredly knowe to be euill, and the effect thereof to bee ſuch, which is voluntarily and of free choyce to be carried to euill. This ſeldom or rather neuer happeneth to any man.

For, as vertue is so faire and appetible a thing in it selfe viewed, as it needeth no helpe to inuite vs to the imbracing therof: so likewise is vice so contemptible and foule, when it is not mistaken, but truely apprehended, as that you shall finde no man that meerely for it selfe wil take holde thereof; according vnto that of ARISTOTLE, *Nemo intendens malum operatur. No man of purpose, and for it selfe committeth euill.* [a] *Nec quisquam* (saith SENECA) *tantum à naturali lege desciuit, & hominem exuit, vt animi causâ malus sit. Neither hath any man so farre strayed from the naturall law, and cast off humanitie, that willingly and of purpose he will be euil.* For, enquire of any man, who liueth by stealth and spoyle, whether hee had not rather come by those goods which he getteth, by more honest meanes. No man will

a Lib. 4. de Beneficiis.

be found, who had not rather finde them, or haue them giuen him. Neither can any make a queſtion, whether hee who hath affected glorie by performing the moſt abhominable actions, would not much ſooner chooſe that fame to happen vnto him for vertue.

Founded on the good which is placed in the fame thereof ariſing.

LXI. *The third* way, the which by the continuall vſe of frequenting it, is made ſo much the more wide then the reſt, is, when the cauſe, which is the action whereby wee endeuour to procure glory, is knowen certainely to be bad; but the effect, the fame thereof ariſing, is apprehended to be good, yea and often times the cauſe is iuſtified, the more to extoll the effect. Heer raigneth, heere triumpheth *Affectation*. By this the iudgement is ſo farre miſled, as that it apprehendeth it better to be remembred and ſpoken

of

of by men; though for vice, then not be ſpoken of and forgotten.

LXII. And of theſe there ſeeme to bee two ſorts; The one, of thoſe, who rather then not, deſire to bee remembred for pure vice and vnexcuſable: The other, for ſuch vice, as may yet at the firſt bluſh, and to the weaker apprehenſions, carrie the face of vertue; to others of better vnderſtanding may ſeeme to be but vertue miſtaken. In that, is more errour; in this, craft. Both, as they place their cheefe good in the remembrance and prayſe of men; ſo doe they conſtitute obliuion and forgetfulneſſe, their oppoſite and cheefeſt euill. Each of them are incited and drawen on by the good, which they imagine to bee incident in the remembraunce or fame of men.

Two kinds of ſuch as practiſe this

the firſt
the ſecond

LXIII. *The*

The first most miserable.

LXIII. *The first* sort are so deluded by this deceite, as conceauing nothing can happen more miserable vnto them than to bee forgotten, they endeuour by any the most ignominious meanes to keepe the memorie of them afloate euen by such, as they most assuredly conceaue, can beget them none other, then a dishonest and contemptible report. Such was that of him who burned the most magnificent and vnmatched Temple of DIANA EPHESINA, and of GABRINVS FVNDVLVS, when hee resolued to ouerthrowe the *Emperour* from the top of a high Tower, onely thereby to bee talked of and had in memorie. These, if we destroy & confute that apprehension of theirs, whereby they place so much good in a lewd fame, are left most ignominious and miserable: as who, not so much as couered by anye the

throwe downe

thinneſt veile of good, lye buryed & ouerwhelmed by their owne moſt deteſtable outrages and miſdeedes.

LXIV. *The other* yet appeare more ſubtile and craftie in their endeuours, and to bee better armed and prouided, againſt any diſcouery that may bee made of them: hauing alwayes ſome thing left to make reſiſtance, though you ſpoyle them of their greateſt and moſt deſired defence. For, theſe lightly ſeeke out ſuch meanes, which may either ſeeme good or indifferent vnto their conceites, who thorough weakeneſſe cannot iudge aright; or, to the better vnderſtādings may appeare but an errour in iudgement in thoſe who performed them; not a fault: which meanes yet ſhall further or moue pittie, or beget a deceitfull commendation.

The ſecond better armed defenſively.

LXV. For example, a man of this making, finding no other way to propagate his fame, ſhall kill ſome worthie and valiant man; and that not baſely, or cowardly, but in the field reſiſting, and ſtoutly. Wherein hee ſhall find ſome ſuch, who will commend him for his valour, for hauing courag iouſly killed a man reputed of ſo vnmatched forces: or at the leaſt, though they enter into conſideration, that he iniuriouſly and without ſufficient cauſe ouerthrew him, they will pittie his worth to haue beene no better employed. Onely thoſe who can iudicially interpret and decipher his corrupt intention, will both diſcommend and abhorre the meane, and the ende: Thoſe, I ſay, who are able truely to diſtinguiſh betwixt true reſolution, and an inordinate & fond appetite to appeare ſo; betwixt wel ordered valure, and brutiſh deſ-

peratneſſe.

peratneſſe. How well and iudicially did AGESILAVS King of *Sparta*, when behoulding an offender moſt conſtantly ſuffering torment, without token of griefe or releting, [a] *Quàm valdè* (ſaide hee) *malus hic homo eſt, in res malas & turpes, tolerantiam, perſeuerantiamq; impendens? How bad and wicked is this man, who employeth ſo conſtantly ſufferance and perſeuerance, in ſo bad and ſhamefull things?*

[a] Plutarch. in Lacon. Apophteg.

LXVI. But to leaue the cauſes & meanes in thẽſelues aſſuredly known to be bad; let vs at lẽgthcome to examine, whether the fame, the effect therof proceeding, (the conſideration of which ſo violently drieth them,) haue at all any good therein. And this two wayes. *Firſt*, whether that remẽbrance, which is had of a man for vice, no way to his cõmendation, but vtter diſpraiſe, haue any

Fame, the effect of affected actions, hath no good in it.

good in it selfe, wherby men should be moued in reason, to build such meanes thereunto. *Secondly*, whether that glorie or praise, which vpō false ground is giuen (as, by such, who for want of iudgement esteemed an action worthy commendation, which in deede was affected) adde any good vnto him, to whom it is attributed. To the first consideration, in general, of this fame acquired by bad and straunge meanes doth occure that position of the *Stoickes*, wherby they did conclude that, [b] *Bonum ex malo non fit. Non nascitur* (sayth SENECA) *ex malo bonum; non magis quàm ficus ex oleâ. Ad semen nata respondent: bona degenerare non possunt. Quemadmodum ex turpi honestum non nascitur, ita ne ex malo quidem bonum: nam idem est honestum, & bonum. Good proceedeth not from euill; no more then figges grow vpon*

b *Seneca.* LXXXVII.

Oliue trees. The crop is answerable to the seede: good cannot degenerate. As vertue ariseth not from vice, so neither good from euill: for vertue and goodnesse are the same. Which if it be so, it followeth, since the cause of this fame is vndoubtedly knowne to be bad, that the effect cannot bee good.

LXVII. But it will bee perhaps denied, that good cannot be produced out of euill. For wee see, that out of manslaughter is borne a remembrance of vs, and the remembrance of a man is good. And therfore onely you will esteem manslaughter to be bad, because it bringeth with it more euill then good. For it yeeldeth fame, but erronious or dishonourable; and that oftentimes with feare, anxietie, torments both of bodie and minde. Whosoeuer shall affirme this, it fol-

loweth that hee admitte, manſlaughter as it is badde, for that it is the cauſe of much euill, ſo likewiſe to bee good in part, becauſe it produceth ſome good; than which what canne bee imagined more abſurde? For if you but abſtract from theſe inconueniences, if you procure ſecuritie vnto it, it will be rendered wholly good.

An Obiectio. LXIIX. Some may obiecte, that Fame is good from whenceſoeuer it ariſeth: for it followeth not that becauſe manſlaughter is a wicked acte, therefore the remembrance of that perſon who committed it ſhould bee alſo wicked. As for example: In an Italian Sallet, which conſiſteth of a multitude of good hearbes, if there happen to bee entermixed woolf-worte; you

there-

therefore reach not your friende of the wholesome hearbes, because there is poyson in the plate; but you giue them him, there being also poyson therein. In the same manner by manslaughter is attained fame: not as it is euill and vicious, but as it is a subiect of fame. Euen as in that Sallet the infectious hearbe is badde, not the other hearbes which do accompanie it; so in manslaughter the sinne is euill, not the fame. To the which, wee may oppose the most vnsutable condition of either of these things. There, I may take the nouriſhing hearbes, leauing the hurtfull: Heere, I cannot attaine fame without manslaughter. This fame is not intermixed with the mischeife, but mited, and vnseparably incorporated.

This fame is not commodious.

LXIX. Farther, this remembance which from ſo euill meanes accrueth, not onely is not good, but neither is it commodious. For (as ſaith SENECA) [a] *Cõmodum eſt, quod plus vſus habet, quàm moleſtiæ. That is commodious, which hath more vſe, then trouble.* The contrarie of which is moſt manifeſt in this. If wee reſpect the vſe of this fame, it is euident, that if it hath any, (for after death it hath none at all) it is but an incitement to farther vice, by the confirmation of the good ſucceſſe of that which is paſt. And, that the crime is accompanied with manifold inconueniences and troubles, no man can denie.

[a] Epiſt. LXXXVIII

Remembrãce for knowen vice no way good.

LXX. Againe, the remembraunce which is had of a man for pure vice no way to his prayſe, but vtter diſhonour, may diuers wayes

be

be ſhewed to haue no good in it ſelfe, by the attraction of which, men ſhould be drawen, willingly & deliberatiuely, to put themſelues into ſo enormious actions. For if you ſeeke the oppoſite to that fame, which ariſeth from iuſt and laudable deſerts; you ſhall finde it to bee this other remembrãce for vice: but that is certainely good; wherefore of neceſſitie this is bad, as placed in the oppoſite extreamitie to the other.

LXXI. Farthermore, ſo far aſtray theſe men are ledde, and ſo farre blinded in iudgement, that they leaue the priuatiue, and fondly embrace the poſitiue euill. For, who during the time of this life, but principally after death, is altogether vnremembred and vnſpoken of; he onely is depriued of glorie: but this other purchaſeth ignominie, which

is the positiue euill contrarie to glorie. For example, one thing it is to bee without pleasure, an other to bee in paine; one thing not to bee beloued, an other to bee hated. Water, that yeeldeth no sauour, is diuerse from that which is corrupted. But such and so ridiculous is the constitution of these men, that they iudicially chuse rather to bee in paine then to bee depriued of pleasure; rather then not to bee beloued, to bee hated; nay, rather then not to smell at all, to stinke.

Prayse misetaken, vnprofitable.

LXXII. The other fame or prayse, which vpon false ground is giuen, may diuerse wayes bee shewed to bring no good all to him, vnto whome it is attributed. For, this commendation proceedeth from errour, which vnto themselues is manifest: and consequently

they

they assuredly knowing the prayse to bee false, fondly delight in falsehood. Then which nothing is more opposite to the vnderstanding, or more vnworthie of the excellencie of humane nature. For (as saith [a] CICERO) *Hominis est propriè veri inquisitio, atque inuestigatio. The search and trace of truth is proper vnto man.* And indeed, what els hath knowledge good in it, whereby it should be rendered so expetible, but truth? [b] *Non aliam putes esse sapientiam, nisi veritatem. Thinke not wisedome or knowledge to bee any thing else but truth.* Which truth where it is wanting, of consequence there can be no goodnesse.

a 1. Officiorum.

b Aug. de liber. arbit.

LXXIII. But it seemeth, that these persons had rather beleeue an vntruth, then nought at all. For they had rather then men should be ignorant of their actions,

Falsehood preferred before ignorance.

haue

haue them bee deceiued and erre; much preferring falsehoode before ignorance: which of all other is the grosseſt absurditie. In that wee neither vnderſtand nor knowe any thing of an other, wee are onely ignorant of his ſtate; in that we iudge otherwiſe of him then truth can allow, we are poſſeſſed with falſehood. And this I thinke will be ſufficient to proue, that the effecte which is the fame ariſing from ſtrange or bad actions, hath no good at all in it ſelf, whereby men ſhould in reaſon bee drawn to make thoſe actiõs a mean thereunto.

LXXIV. Whereunto I will onely adde this, and ſo paſſe on to the following braunches. If we would propound vnto our ſelues to prayſe and commend a man of this ſort, there are three things which would fall into deliberation; what

went

went before, what did accompany, and what would follow ſuch proceedings. Theſe, if they bee good, themſelues ſufficiently commend the ſubiect; if euill, diſcommend it. That is the perfite prayſe, which rehearſeth the præcedēt beginning of the thing, declareth the preſent forme, and foreſheweth the future euents thereof. From the antecedents each thing is prayſed as *noble*, from the preſent as *great*, from the future as *profitable*. Wherefore out of thoſe, theſe three cheefely are compriſed in prayſes: *worthineſſe*, *greatneſſe*, and *profitte*. Whereof if any one, or any parcell of one of them, may bee founde appliable vnto theſe courſes, I ſhall bee ſoone drawen to admit them not onely iuſtifiable, but praiſe-worthie.

LXXV. Theſe faynings

Faining, to light a subiect for glory.

are not the meanes to poſſeſſe glory: they are the highe way to infamie. Hee is much deceiued, whoſoeuer thinkes hee can attaine true and ſtable glorie by vaine oſtentation, fayned ſhewes, inſubſtantiall diſguiſements. [a] *Vera gloria radices agit, atque etiam propagatur: ficta omnia celeriter, tanquam floſculi, decidunt; nec ſimulatum poteſt quidquam eſſe diuturnum.* *True glorie taketh roote, and ſpreadeth it ſelfe abroade: all fayned thinges, like vnto flowers, do quickely wither; neither can any fained thing, bee laſting.* The onely true, neere, and moſt compendious way to this glorie, SOCRATES (the wiſeſt of men) affirmed to bee, [b] *Si quis id ageret, vt qualis haberi vellet, talis eſſet.* *If a man would ſo carrie himſelfe, that indeede hee were ſuch a one as hee would bee ta-*

a *Cicero, de officiis. lib. 2.*

b *Cicero. Ibid. Socratis de gloriâ præceptum.*

ken

ken to bee. c *Nihil* (saieth SENECA) *Simulatio proficit. Paucis imponit leuiter extrinsecus inducta facies: veritas in omnem partem sui semper rotunda est. Quæ decipiunt, nihil habent solidi. Tenue est mendacium: perlucet si diligenter inspexeris. Faining doth profit nothing. A slight outward face begileth but a few; truth is round on euerie side. Those things which deceiue, haue nothing solide in them. Deceite is shallowe, it is transparent, if you heedfully looke into it.*

c Epist. LXXIX.

LXXVI. To conclude, it will bee perhappes not vnworthie the beehoulding, to see and regarde whether the priuation of fame bee hurtfull vnto a man, or noe; whether there happen any misery thereby. This question will receiue much

The priuation of fame is not hurtfull.

light

light from that elegant distinction of CHRYSIPPVS, mentioned by [a] SENECA: Who was wont to affirme *Sapientem nullâ re indigere, & tamen multis illi rebus opus esse; contrà, stulto nullâ re opus est; nullâ enim re scit vti, sed omnibus eget. That a wise man standeth in neede of nothing, notwithstanding that many things are expedient or requisite vnto him: To the contrarie, to a foole nothing is expedient, because he knoweth not how to vse any thing, but he wanteth euerie thing.* Not so aptly to be englished, because these *Stoicall* distinctions are rendered much the fuller by the significant proprietie of the wordes wherein they are framed. But for the better vnderstanding; A wise man hath *vse* for many thinges, as of hands, eyes, and such like, conducible to our dayly liuing: yet *needeth* hee nothing; because to *neede*, impli-

a Epist. 1X.

eth

eth a neceſſitie: but to a wiſe man nothing is of *neceſsitie*: yet though hee haue perfite content of and within himſelfe, it is *requiſite* neuertheleſſe that hee haue friends. Of thoſe hee deſireth to haue manie, not thereby to liue happily: for he can liue happily euen without friendes. *Summum bonum* (ſayeth [b] SENECA) *extrinſecus inſtrumenta non quærit, domi colitur: ex ſe totum eſt. Incipit fortunæ eſſe ſubiectum, ſi quam partem ſui foris quærit. The cheefe good ſeeketh not meanes from without, it is inhabitant at home: it is altogether of it ſelfe. It beginneth to be ſubiect to Fortune when it endeuoureth to fetch in anye part of it ſelfe from without.*

b Ibidem.

LXXVII. Hee is carried

Friendship to a wise man naturall; not for vse, as Epicurus *would. Whose words are in* Laërtius: Ἔσται καὶ γίγνεσθαι τὴν φιλίαν, διὰ τὰς χρείας. *Friendship to be, and to bee contracted, for vse. A wise man embraceth it for it selfe.*

vnto friendshippe, not by his owne profit, but by a naturall inclination and instinct thereunto: Or more worthily, by a desire of procuring good vnto his friend. In respect of himselfe, hee neuer wanteth any thing. Let him liue amongst men, or take away societie; let him bee married, or vnmarried; giue him children, or take them away, all is one, and one is all vnto him; exteriour things cannot alter his inward state. VVisedome is aboue Fortune.

LXXIX. Out of this distinction, to apply it to the present vse, we may obserue thus much touching the state of this question. This fame, (as before hath beene sayde) being a thing indifferent, vsed in a relation to our neighbours good, is a principall meane therunto, and so is made of worth. A thing indeed

ſo neceſſarie in reſpecte of our neighbour, that one doubted not to ſay, c *Duo tibi ſunt neceſſaria, ſcilicet conſcientia, & fama: conſcientia propter te, fama propter proximum. Qui conſcientiæ ſuæ confidens, famam negligit, crudelis eſt.* *Two thinges are neceſſarie vnto thee, conſcience and fame: conſcience for thy ſelfe, fame for thy neighbour. Who truſting too confidently to his owne conſcience, doth neglect his fame, is cruell.* Wherefore if it bee true, as it is, that a competent fame, ſo much as will ſerue to remooue diſtruſte, and beget confidence to our proceedings with our friend, is not to bee neglected: ſo likewiſe is it not to bee doubted, that as the good which wee receiue thereby, (for all actions of vertue are good) ariſeth

c D. Aug. lib. de communi ſer. cle.

from the bettering of our neighbor; ſo if there be any inconuenience or miſerie accompanying the want of this fame, it cannot accrue by any, but by the ſame meanes, that is frõ our defect to our neighbour. For in reſpect of our ſelues, as wee need no fame, ſo neither can wee receiue the leaſt inconuenience by the poſſeſſion or priuation thereof.

Fame either pleaſing or profitable.

LXXX. From this fame being had, either ariſeth pleaſure or profit: Profit, out of the good and orderly employment thereof towards out friend: pleaſure to a wiſe man cannot accrue from this; a ſober content may. Pleaſure therfore is taken therin, when for it ſelfe it is deſired and ſought after, without any other reference, by ſuch men, who voide of ſufficiencie, and of corrupt iudgement (whereof as wee haue proued this effect is an e-

uident

uident ſigne) feele an inward kinde of tickling delight at each prayſe true or falſe indifferently, which is allotted vnto them. The want therfore or priuatiō of this fame, which meerely for it ſelfe, our ſelues, and the pleaſure wee conceiue thereof, is deſired and ſought after, would be conſidered, whether it diſ-enable or depriue vs of any good which from the poſſeſſiō therof would redound: or adde any eſſentiall miſerie or calamitie vnto vs.

LXXXI. And to begin with the later, firſt; The euils perchance wherewith the want of fame may bee obiected to aſſault a man withall, may bee, *Obſcuritie*, *Obliuion*, *Darkeneſſe*, *Contempt*, *Sorrow*, and ſuch like: for that they are the oppoſite extreamities vnto thoſe, which by the enioying therof are acquited, *Dignitie*, *renowne*, *nobilitie*, *admiration*,

The want of fame addeth not any eſſentiall miſerie.

miration, *pleasure*, with the rest. The which all, to auoyde particular reasons, are most easily put off by this one consideration, that in relation vnto our selues they are not hurtfull; no more then *fame*, *honour*, *prayse*, are profitable.

Externall things cannot hurt a wise man.

LXXXII. For, as these exteriour thinges vnto a wise man can adde no good, so likewise neither can they inflict any true miserie or harme. Else were wisedome hardly beset, if externall thinges could not auaile it, and yet could afflict, and disauaile it. Daungerous and vneasie were the seat of a wise man, if excluded from the fauourable and happy-seeming embracements of Fortune, hee were left without shelter to resist the blastes and manifold assaults thereof. But, it is euident that these miseries take not hould of a wise man,

since

since the handles whereby they hould, are the perturbed affectes of our mindes; which SENECA affirmeth to bee farre from a man truely wise. For (saith hee) [a] *Qui prudens est, & temperans est: qui temperans est, & constans: qui constans est, & imperturbatus est: qui imperturbatus est, sine tristitiâ est: qui sine tristitiâ est, beatus est: ergo prudens beatus est; & prudentia ad beatam vitam satis est. Who is wise, is also temperate: who is temperate, is constant: who is constant, is vntroubled: who is vntroubled, is without sorrow: who is without sorrow, is happie: wherfore hee that is wise, is also happie; and wisedome is sufficient to a happie life.*

A wise man is voide of affects.

[a] Epist. LXXXV.

Prudence is sufficient to a happie life.

LXXXIII. Against this collection he introduceth some of the PERIPATETICKE sect arguing in

The Peripatetickes take not away affectes in a wise man, but moderate them.

this sort, to interpret *vntroubled, constant, without sorrowe,* as if hee were *vntroubled,* who sildome and but slightly is disturbed, not who neuer. Likewise to auerre him to bee without sorrow, who is not easily subiect to sorrow, neither is too much or too frequēt in this vice. For that humane nature doth not allow any mans minde to bee absolutely exempt from sorrow: a wise man is not ouercome with sorrowe, otherwise he is touched therewith. These men take not away these affects, but temper them. But, how much is it, I pray you, that wee giue vnto a wise man, if we make him stronger then the weakest, ioyfuller then the most sorrowfull, more moderate then the most vnbridled, and greater then the vilest? No meruaile (saith [b] SENECA) if LADAS admire his own swiftnesse, when he respecteth the weake and lame.

b Ibidem.

Illa vel intactæ ſegetis per ſumma volaret
Gramina, nec curſu teneras læſiſſet ariſtas,
Vel mare per medium fluctu ſuſpẽſa tumenti,
Ferret iter, celeres nec tingueret æquore plantas.
That ſwiftneſſe would haue ſlowen vpon the toppes
Of ſlender reeded corne, nor yet haue hurt
The tender eares with ſpeedie-running race;
Or borne vpon the ſwelling waues would haſte,
Nor in the Sea haue wet her nimble ſoles.

LXXXIV. This is a ſwiftneſſe in it ſelfe conſidered, not with collation to the tardieſt and moſt ſlowe. *Quid ſi ſanum voces, leuiter febriti tantem? non eſt bona valetu-*

do, mediocritas morbi. What if you call him healthie, who is ſicke of a ſleight ague? A meane or light ſickeneſſe, is not good health. A wiſe man therefore out of the *Stoicke* decrees, muſt bee ſubiect to no affects, notwithſtanding any difficultie that offereth it ſelfe out of the conſideration of the imbecillity of humane nature: ſince wee are not to accommodate or limit wiſedom to our naturall frailtie, but to conſider that, to be in it ſelf, a thing, which where it is admitteth no imperfectiõs. And ſo conſequently not to iudge of wiſdome and prudence by the view of our naturall weakeneſſe, but by that as by a moſt certaine and infallible rule to come to the knowledge and giue ſentence of our infirmities: aſſuredly knowing that what in our actions is not anſwerable to the naked, vnpartiall, and true conſideration of that, cannot

Wiſdome the diſcouerer of our imperfections.

bee

bee bettered by bringinge that downe, and proportioning it vnto it; but is so farre to bee deemed erronious and vnperfitte, as in a right iudgement it shall carry more or lesse distaunce from the streight prudentiall line wherunto it should bee paralell.

LXXXV. This may euidētly be gathered, out of all the definitions of Wisedome; which SENECA defineth to be, [a] *Semper idē velle, & idem nolle. Alwayes to wil, and not to will the same.* Although you adde not that later clause, so as it bee right and iust alwaies that you will. Neuer can any thing alwaies please a man, but that which is right. Wherfore if the same thing do please thee now, which hath displeased thee, thinke it not the effect of wisdom, but of thy shalownesse.

Wisdom defined by Seneca.

a Epist. XX.

The

By the Stoicker.

The *Stoikes* all affirme *Prudence* to to be *an exact following of Nature*; that is, God. [b] *Ab illa* (ſaieth SENECA) *non decerrare, & ad illius legem exemplúmque formari, ſapientia eſt. True wiſedome is, not to aberre from her*, that is, *Nature*; and to follow, *and bee framed according to her law & exãple.* And CHRYSIPPVS, τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ ἀκολόθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν. That *The end is to liue conueniently vnto nature.* [a] *Beata ergo vita*, (ſaieth SENECA) *conueniens naturæ ſuæ: quæ non aliter contingere poteſt, quàm ſi primùm ſana mens eſt, & in perpetuâ poſſeſsione ſanitatis ſuæ. Deinde, ſi fortis ac vehemens, tum pulcherrima & patiens, ãpta temporibus, corporis ſui pertinentiúmque ad id curioſa; non anxiè tamen: rerum quæ vitam inſtruunt, diligens, ſine admiratione cuiuſquam: vſura fortunæ muneribus, non ſeruitura. A happie life*

b Lib. de beatâ vitâ. cap. 3.

By Chryſippus.

a Ibidem.

is agreeable vnto nature: which cannot otherwise happen, then if there bee first a whole and sound minde, and in a perpetuall possession of his soundnesse. Farther, if it be strong and vehement, then most faire and patient, appliable vnto times, curious of his body and things therunto belonging, but not heauily; diligent in things which instruct our life, without admiring any thing: framed to vse Fortunes gifts, not to serue thē. If any thing therefore offer it selfe vnto our desires, or bee performed in our actions, contrarie to the due and orderly course of naturall proceeding, it participateth of errour, not wisedome.

LXXXVI. Againe, SENECA in that Epistle wherin he proposeth to declare the difference betwixt *Sapience*, and *Philosophie*, [c] *Sapientia* (saith he) *perfectum bonum est*

c Epist. LXXXIX.

mentis

ment is humanæ: Philosophia sapientiæ amor est & affectatio. Sapience is the perfect good of a humane mind: Philosophie (as the word importeth) *is the loue and desire of wisedom.* Others also haue defined wisedome to be, *Diuinarum humanarúmq; rerũ scientiam. A knowledge of Diuine & humane things.* But to limite this knowledge vnto a man & cõsider it as vnperfit, is to take away & vtterly to bereaue vs of the most safe & vndoubted rule of our life.

By others.

A wise man ought not to be esteemed so in relation to others folly.

LXXXVII. For, without doubt, it is not enough to the perfection of a wise man to rayse him aboue the meanest or ordinary sort of men: because we may not measure him by their imperfections, but their imperfections by the infallible prudence we behould in him. [d] *Non enim diminutionem malorum* (saith he) *in bono viro intelligo, sed vacationem.*

d Ibidem.

tionem. For I vnderſtand not a leſſening of vices in a good man, but an exemption. If you leaue any affects vnto a wiſe man, his reaſon ſhall be vnequall vnto them, and ſhall be carried away as with a violent ſtreame: eſpecially ſince you leaue him not one, but the whole rake of them, where-with to ſtruggle.

LXXXIIX. Neither maketh any whit againſt this aſſertion, that which ſome do obiect, this wiſe man ſo compleate hardly and ſildome to be found. [a] *Neque enim magna, & excedentia ſolitum & vulgarem modum, crebrò gignũtur. For neither are great things, and ſuch as exceede the accuſtomable and vulgar manner, often and obiouſly bredde.* It ſufficeth that there may be ſuch, haue been many, and no doubt are ſome

It is not material though this wiſe man be rarely found.

a *Seneca* lib. de conſtantiâ ſapientis. cap. 7.

Where-

Wherfore if we ſhal deſire or feare, let vs not account our ſelues wiſe: but as often as wee are led by theſe affects, let vs acknowledge with the great ALEXANDER our weakeneſſe; who beſieging the Towne of *b Mazagarum*, whileſt hee ranged about the walles to finde out the weakeſt thereof, was ſtrooke with an arrowe in the legge, of the which the bloode being ſpent when out of the drie and colde wound hee began to feele much paine, enforced to ſtay, *Omnes* (ſaid he) *iurant me* IOVIS *eſſe filium; ſed vulnus hoc, hominem eſſe me clamat. All of you ſweare that I am the ſonne of* IVPITER: *but this wound auoucheth mee to bee but a man.* The ſame ought we to do, whē flatterie ſootheth vp our eares, ſaying, All of you proclaime mee to bee wiſe; but I manifeſtly knowe how many vnprofitable things, nay

b Q. Curtius lib. 8. *Arſianus. lib. 4.*

how

how many hurtfull I desire.

LXXXIX. Taking away therefore these inordinate affectes, as of right we ought to do, it is most euident, that none of these exteriour euils, *Obscuritie, darkenesse, contempt, sorrow*, can take any holde of a wise man. c *Sapiens* (saith SENECA) *ad omnem incursum munitus & intentus; non si paupertas, non si luctus, non si ignominia, non si dolor impetum faciat, pedem referet. Interritus & contra illa ibit, & inter illa. A wise man is intentiue and armed against all assaults; though pouertie, sorrowe, ignominie, anguish endeuour to surprise him. Hee vnaffright shall goe both among and against them.*

c Epist. LIX.

XC. What therefore? shall there none bee found to prouoke and tempt him? Nothing on

A wise man is subiect to be tempted.

earth

earth is so sacred, nothing so holy, which is not subiect to sacriledge. What? shall wee in that respect thinke any the most diuine thing to become of the lesse value, because the wicked abuse it, the greatnesse whereof is aboue their reach, neither can at all bee violated by them? No man is so weake, to affirme it. a *Invulnerabile est, nõ quod nõ feritur, sed quod nõ læditur. Not that which is not strooken is invulnerable, but which is not hurt.* By this marke a wise man is to bee knowen. b *Nunquid dubium est, quin certius robur sit, quod non vincitur, quàm quod non lacessitur? cùm dubiæ sint vires inexpertæ: at meritò certissima firmitas habeatur, quæ omnes incursus respuit. Sic tu, sapientem melioris scito esse naturæ, si nullius illi iniuria nocet, quàm si nulla sit. Is there any doubt, but that, that is the firmer*

a Sen. lib. de const. Sapientis.

b Ibidem. *The marke whereby to discerne a wise man.*

strength,

ſtrength, which is not ouercome, thē that which is not oppoſed? ſince vntried forces are doubtfull, and that firmeneſſe is worthily eſteemed ſo, which hath reſiſted all aſſaults. So thou, know that wiſe man to bee of better ſort, whome no iniurie can hurt, then hee to whome none is offered. Hee is worthily to be called a valiant and ſtout man, whom abroad in the field all the force and malice of his enemie cannot preuaile againſt, cannot hurt; not hee who at home lieth ouerwhelmed with eaſe and idleneſſe. Such a wiſe man therefore as this, cannot bee moleſted, cannot bee iniured.

XCI. Though a thouſand apply dayly the meanes to vex, to prouoke, to ſtirre and egge him, he is vnmooued in himſelfe; for that theſe things though neuer ſo ſtifly

Exteriour attempts fall ſhort of a wiſe man.

bent, cannot arriue to him. If they light on his bodie, they cannot reach his minde. That is aboue the ayme of malice; how much more aboue iniurie the execution thereof? *Contumely* or *Contempt* is a thing, whereof we may better complaine then reuenge our selues: A thing so meane and abiect, as the lawes haue not thought it worthie of punishment. [c] *Hanc affectũ* (saith SENECA) *mouet humilitas animi, contrahentis se, ob factum dictúmq; inhonorificum. This affect a kind of remissnesse of our minde doth beget, drawing in and streightening it self, at the assault of some dishonorable word or deede.*

[c] Ibidem.

XCII. Such a one, yesterday, admitted me not, whilest he admitted others: an other, either laughed at my speach, or proudly disdained it: a third placed me in the lowest and most ignominious seate: and

such

ſuch like. What are theſe but effeminate complaints of a loathing minde, into the which for the moſt part the tender and delicate do fall? Theſe being thinges indifferent in themſelues are not hurtfull: they are made bad and hurtfull for the greater part by the fault of our interpreting. What if my words haue been by him derided, diſdained? If they tẽded to his good, he hath the loſſe, not I. If to procure my ſelf any external good frõ him, I erred in wiſdom. If to ſtir vp or adde vnto both of vs ſome internall good, hee loſeth the effect by his contempt, I retaine it. As for the ſpeach, it neither betereth by gratious acceptance, nor impaireth by repulſe. The like is in admittãce, in place: which are alwaies varied by the good or improper interpretation wee make thereof. This was excellently well declared by the Philoſopher ARISTIPPVS,

Contempt the ſtronger, by miſinterpreting.

Ariſtippus.

whome when DIONYSIVS had placed in the meaneſt and moſt cõtemptible ſeate, *Hunc* (ſayth hee) *locum ô Rex illuſtrem & honeſtum deinceps vis reddere. It ſeemeth O King, that thou intendeſt henceforth to make this place honourable.* And AGESILAVS King of the *Lacædemonians*, when at a ſolemne ſport or play hee was brought to ſomething a diſhonourable place, *Ageſilaus.* a *Benè habet ſanè* (ſaid hee): *oſtendam enim non locum viris, ſed viros loco conciliare dignitatem. It is verie well, for I will ſhewe you, that place addeth not worth vnto men, but men to places.* a Plutarch. in Laco.

XCIII. To conclude this obiection, admirably ſaith SENECA in this behalfe, (as hee doth in all others) b *Itaque nec prudentiæ quicquam in ſe eſſe, nec fiduciæ oſtendit, qui contumeliâ afficitur, non* b Lib. de conſtantiâ ſapientis. cap. 10.

dubiè

dubiè enim contemptum se iudicat: & hic morsus non sine quadam humilitate animi euenit, supprimentis se ac descendentis. Sapiens autem à nullo contemnitur, magnitudinem suam nouit: nullique tantum de se licere, renunciat sibi: & omnes has, quas non miserias animorum, sed molestias dixerim non vincit, sed ne sentit quidem. Wherefore who playneth himselfe to haue beene contumeliously vsed, sheweth that there is neither prudẽce, nor confidence in him; for he manifestly iudgeth himselfe to haue beene contemned: and this nip happeneth not, without a remisnesse of minde, suppressing it selfe and deiecting. But, a wise man is contemned of none, hee is acquainted with his owne greatnes: hee informeth himself, that no man hath so much power ouer him: and all these not miseries but troubles of the minde hee ouercommeth not,

A wise man is contemned of none.

but neither doth hee feele them.

A wise man not vnsensible of harme.

XCIV. Not that wee will make this wise man to haue no feeling, like vnto an image or a stone; for other thinges there are which strike him, althogh they ouerthrow him not: as, Diseases and paines of his bodie (whereby hee is rendered vnfitte for exercise) the losse of his friendes or children, the calamitie & ouerthrow of his Countrie. These no doubt are felt by him. [a] *Nulla virtus est, quæ non sentias perpeti. It is not vertue, to endure that which thou feelest not.* Which elegantly PLATO expressed, when he asked of DIOGENES, who stood naked in the extreamitie of a colde frost, applying a *Statua* of marble vnto his naked body; Doest thou not feele this colde, DIOGENES? Hee auerring that hee did not: PLATO replyed, *Quider-*

a Ibidem.

Diogenes.

go magnum facis? What great thing doeſt thou then?

XCV. Sufficient it is, though wee feele neuer ſo much theſe extreamities (for the more wee feele, the greater is the ouertuling power) that wee bee not ouercome and ouerthrowen by them. In theſe conſiſteth the exercíſe of vertue, and of wiſedome. Theſe blowes he receiueth: but hee forthwith healeth them receiued,& compreſſeth them. But theſe other of leſſe importaunce, as *contempt*, *ſorrow*, *iniurie*, *indignitie* and ſuch other, he hath not ſo much as a feeling of them; neither againſt them doth hee bring foorth his firmer forces of ſettled and accuſtomable vertue in ſuffering: but either regardeth them not at all, or eſteemeth thē worthie onely of laughter. Out of this therefore it is manifeſt,

But neither is he weakened thereby.

that the priuation of fame, by the which these may arise, is not onely not hurtful vnto a wise man, in relatiō to himself, but neither is it incōuenient, since no conuenience vnto himselfe by the possession thereof can redounde. And if these reasons take place in a iust fame and deserued, how much more do they abase and deiect that sordide fame which is attained by vice, and giuen for vice? And thus much to proue that the want of fame (though iust) annexeth not any essentiall miserie vnto him where it is wanting.

The want of fame depriueth not vs of any good.

XCVI. The other part was, whether the lacke of this fame depriue vs of any good, which by the possession thereof we should receiue. It is manifest, if we consider it in respect of our selues, that we are not depriued of any the least good

by the want of fame, in that the poſſeſſion of it (as hath beene ſayd) can adde none vnto vs. Doth any man prayſe and commend a wiſe man for the performance of ſome rarely noble and heroicall action? Hee doth as befitteth. The prayſe thereof redoundeth to himſelfe. Thinke you that this commendation addeth any thing to him that is wiſe? It ſtirreth vp perhaps his deſire of wiſedome and vertue. That is againſt our ſuppoſition. Wee intende him alreadie truely wiſe and vertuous. For the reſt, as it addeth nothing, ſo in the like ſort it taketh nought away. What is more knowen then that wee looſe nothing in our ſelues by the priuation of fame?

XCVII. A wiſe man affecteth not things without himſelfe: if they happen vnto him, hee vſeth them

Externall things not auayleable to a wiſe man.

them as ordained for his vse. Heerein he differeth from a foole, for that wealth, honour, fame by a wise man are commanded, in a foole they command. Then, if in himselfe it be, from whence hee deriueth his good, how can fame be a meane to himselfe to obtaine it? If you say by stirring & prouoking him to the more earnest endeuour to procure it; it is alreadie answered. Neuertheless, if we grant it, it auaileth not. For, exteriour fame is not so much requisite therunto, as an inward self esteeming. From our selues therefore it is certaine, wee neither get more or lesse by the possession or priuation thereof; since it cannot be a meane vnto our selues, from our selues to deriue it.

The want of fame depriueth vs of nought, but that which by the possession we should haue.

XCIIX. Againe, the priuation of fame can by no meanes depriue a man from any good

which

which commeth not by the poſſeſſion thereof: but none vnto himſelfe redounderh by the poſſeſsion therof: wherefore it is euident, that it can depriue vs of none at all. That the want of fame, cannot depriue vs of any good which commeth otherwiſe then by the poſſeſsion therof, it is manifeſt; becauſe priuation doth not take away any thing but by being oppoſite thereunto. The priuation of fame is onely oppoſite to the poſſeſſion thereof: wherefore of conſequence it depriueth vs of nothing, but that which the poſſeſſion therof hath yealded vs; ſince whatſoeuer good commeth otherwiſe, remaineth whole and inuiolable with the priuation of fame. If you doubt whether priuation take nought away but that wherunto it is directly oppoſite; who knoweth not that the priuation of any thing taketh nought away, but

by

by putting a negation thereunto: and for so much as it onely putteth a negation vnto that, whereunto it is opposite, it followeth vndoubtedly that it depriueth vs of nothing else, but that vnto which it is opposite.

No good ariseth by fame properly.

XCIX. But to establish the second part of this assertion, that no good ariseth vnto our selues by the possession of fame, this may seeme sufficient, that whatsoeuer is properly good vnto vs, is in our owne will and power both to get, and to keepe: but fame, being a thing externall, dependeth meerely vpon other mens iudgements and willes: out of which is necessarily inferred that we obtaine no true & essentiall good therby. That, what soeuer is properly good vnto vs, is in our power to get and keepe, hath been alreadie sufficiently proued; a

thing obuiously auerred by all *Ethicke* writers, and all others.

C. Else, how miserable and deiected were the state and condition of man, if it lay not within his power, but depended vpon others concurrences and willes, whether hee should bee happie, or not? if externall things were necessarie vnto the essence of his happinesse? if the perfection of his happinesse lay without his reach? How seruile & abased were the state of men, if we were inforced to make meanes, and sue one to the other for the attaining of our blisse? Truely wee should be inferiour in this and more miserable than the brute beastes. For they what good is proper vnto any of them, haue it and containe it within themselues; exteriourly one to the other can adde nothing.

It lyeth within our power to be happie.

Else we were inferiour to the beasts.

CI. What is therefore the proper good of man? Reason. By this wee are aduanced aboue brute beasts, by this wee follow God immmediately. The perfection therefore of this reason is the cheefe good of man: the rest are common vnto him with the beasts.

a Epist. LXXVI. *a Valet* (saith SENECA)? *& leones. formosus est? & pauones. velox est? & equi. Non dico, in his omnibus vincitur. Non quæro quid in se maximum habeat, sed quid suum. Corpus habet? & arbores. habet impetum, & motum voluntarium? & bestiæ & vermes. habet vocem? sed quantò clariorem canes, acutiorem aquilæ, grauiorem tauri, dulciorem mobiliorémq; luscinia? Is he strong? so are Lyons. is hee beautifull? so are Pecockes. is hee swift? so are horses. I omitte that in all these hee is surpassed. I seek not what he hath greatest in him, but what his owne. Hath*

he a body? Trees haue alſo a bodie. Hath hee a ſtirring and voluntarie motiõ? ſo haue beaſts, ſo haue worms. Hath hee a voice? but how much a clearer haue dogges, a ſhriller eagles, a deeper Oxen, the nightingales an eaſier ordered voice and ſweeter?

CII. Reaſon therfore, and the perfection thereof, the proper good of man, commeth not extrinſecally, but is engrafted within our ſelues. Chance hath no power ouer it; as neither to take it away, ſo nor to giue it. [a] *Quid expectas? nulli ſapere caſu obtigit. What expect you? no man is wiſe by chaunce.* For either theſe goods of Fortune are not good, as well noted [b] SENECA; or men are happier then God. For thoſe things which ſeeme good vnto vs, are not in vſe with him. *Nec enim libido ad illum,*

The perfection of reaſon the proper good of man.

a Ibidem.

b Epiſt. LXXXV.

Goods of Fortune are not good.

nec epularum lautitia, nec opes. Incredibile autem eſt bona Deo deeſſe; hoc ipſum argumentum eſt, bona non eſſe, quæ Deo deſunt. For neither with him is there luſt, nor exceſſe of banquetting, nor riches. But it is incredible that goods are defectiue in him: which is an euident argument that whatſoeuer is abſent from him is not good.

CIII. Againe, theſe goods, where they do aboũd, that is in him whom the vulgare call and account happie, are not poſſeſſed by him, but poſſeſſe him. Wherin they not onely looſe vertue of al things moſt deſirable, but euen pleaſure alſo; for that hee hauing not that, but that hauing and commanding him doth ſometimes afflict and torture him with want and reſtraint therof, ſomtimes choke & ſtrãgle him with aboundance and ſtore; ſo much the

Becauſe vnſtable.

more

more vnable to withſtand the violent aſſaults of either, by how much hee is deuoid of vertue, the ſureſt hould and ſtearne of our life. Theſe are left miſerable if forſaken by them; more miſerable if ouerwhelmed. c *Euenit hoc* (ſayth SENECA) *nimiâ intemperantiâ & amore cæco rei. Nam mala pro bonis petenti, periculoſum eſt aſſequi. Vt feras cum labore periculoque venamur, & captarum quoque illarum ſollicita poſſeſsio eſt; ſæpè enim laniant dominos: ita habentes magnas voluptates, in magnum malum euaſère, captæque cepère. This happeneth by too much intemperance, and blind loue thereof. For the attaining is daungerous, where bad things for good are deſired. As we hunt wilde beaſts with labour and perill, and the keeping alſo of them is not vntroubleſome; for often they deuour their maſters: ſo who haue great*

c Lib. de vitâ beatâ.

pleasures, are plunged into great hazard; for they being taken, take also againe.

The highest gift of Fortune fostereth his deuourers.

CIV. What the greatest happinesse of Fortune amongst men is there, which nourisheth not his deuourers? Elegantly BOETHIVS,

d Lib. 4. de consol. Philos. Met. 2.

d *Quos vides sedere celso*
Solij culmine reges,
Purpurâ claros nitente,
Septos tristibus armis,
Ore toruo comminantes,
Rabie cordis anhelos;
Detrahit si quis superbis
Vani tegmina cultus,
Iam videbit intus arctas
Dominos ferre catenas.
Hinc enim libido versat
Auidis corda venenis:
Hinc flagellat ira mentem
Fluctus turbida tollens,
Mœror aut captos fatigat,

Aut ſpes lubrica torquet.
Ergo, cùm caput tot vnum
Cernas ferre tyrannos,
Non facit, quod optat, ipſe
Dominis preſſus iniquis.
Thoſe Kings, whom thou admireſt
Seated in higheſt thrones,
In ſhining purple proud,
Fenſed with fearefull armes,
Menacing with countenance ſterne,
Panting with their inward rage;
Draw but the curtaines which
Doe ſhadow this vaine height,
Within thou ſhalt behould them
Fettered with captiue chaines.
For, hence luſt oft infecteth
Their harts with greedie venime,
Fell anger thence doth ſcourge
Their minds, rough tẽpeſts raiſing,
Or ſorrowe them captiueth,
Or ſlipperie hope them tortureth.
Then ſince thou ſeeſt one head
To beare ſo many tyraunts,
Hee doth not what hee would

With so hard Lords oppreſt.

The height of Fortune hath a steep descent.

CV. And no doubt (sayth SENECA) It is not hard to shew, these darlinges and fondlinges of Fortune, happie in the vulgare opinion, trembling and amased at their owne enuious height, to haue farre another opiniõ of themselues, then of them is had. a *Nam quæ aliis videntur excelsa, ipsis prærupta sunt. Itaque exanimantur & trepidant, quoties despexerunt in illud magnitudinis suæ præceps. Cogitant enim varios casus, & in sublimi maximè lubricos: tunc appetita formidant, & quæ & illos graues aliis reddit, grauior ipsis felicitas incumbit. For, what to others seemeth high, to them is daungerous and steepe. Wherefore they are astonished and affrighted, as often as they looke into the downfall of their greatnesse. For they remember ma-*

a Epist, XCIV.

ny

ny chaunces, and on highe moſt ſlipperie: then they feare what they lately deſired, and that happineſſe which maketh them greeuous to others, much more greeuouſly ouerhangeth themſelues. Theſe things, though they bee the greateſt gifts of Fortune, haue nothing ſolide in them, nothing conſtant. Wiſedome, and vertue the true and proper good of man, are neither augmented by theſe exteriour accidents, nor impaired. They but giue vs matter of good and bad, & the beginning of things, which from our ſelues muſt either proceede good or euill.

CVI. For, our minde is ſtronger then Fortune; that leadeth our owne things as it is diſpoſed either to the better part or to the worſe, and is the cauſe vnto it ſelfe, as of a happie, ſo alſo of a miſerable

Our mind, the procurer of our good.

life. Hee onely therefore is happie, whome nothing can leſſen: who, houlding the higheſt place, nor enclineth, nor leaneth vpon ought but himſelfe: himſelfe is the onely reſt and ſtay vnto himſelfe. For, [b] *Qui aliquo auxilio ſuſtinetur, poteſt cadere. Whoſoeuer is ſuſtained with an others helpe, may fall:* which was well obſerued by the Poët *Iuuenall* when hee ſaid,

b Sen. Epiſt. XCII.

——*miſerum eſt aliorum incumbere famæ,*
Ne collapſa ruant ſubductis tecta columnis.
Tis daungerous on others fame to reſt:
Faile but the prop, th' art with the fall oppreſt.

Whatſoeuer we haue of our ſelues, and of our owne (as wee haue all our cheefeſt good) becauſe it is not of anothers iuriſdiction and gift, cannot be enforced from vs. [c] *Quod*

c Idem. Epiſt. LIX.

non dedit fortuna, non eripit. That which Fortune gaue not, ſhee taketh not away.

CVII. Farther, if whatſoeuer is properly good vnto vs, were not in our owne power to get and keepe, how fairely excuſable were the folly of men, by all wiſe men ſo much and often reprehended, if they might readily bring for current anſwere, that it lay not in their power to do otherwiſe? All lawes both naturall and ciuill doe conſtitute an exemption & immunitie of things, which wee are vnable to performe. *Vltra poſſe, non eſt eſſe.* But who euer did exempt any man from the execution of vertue? who euer exacted not of duetie the flying, nay the ſubduing of vice? were not theſe in our power, neither were there any power to exact them. The neceſſitie of this per-

The folly of men excuſed by neceſſitie, if our good were not in our power.

fourmance, relieth on the possibilitie; the impossibilitie ouerthroweth the necessitie. Who could iustly blame the effeminate PARIS, for ouerthrowing the flowrishing & most large kingdome of *Asia*, driuen headlong by the fond desire of a momentanie pleasure? if he might bring, for sufficient excuse, the fitte meanes, the naturall softnesse of his heart, the violence of loue, the vnauoydable necessitie thereof, and such like. Now is hee iustly by all condemned of weakenesse; because he had, or might haue had that within himselfe, which would not onely haue shewed him the no necessitie of this acte, but also the easie auoidance thereof.

Fame, because out of our power, is not good.

CIIX. VVherfore, it being but too much proued, that whatsoeuer is properly good vnto vs, is in our power as to get, so to keep; it fol-

loweth

loweth, that fame, becauſe it is not in our power neither way, is not properly good vnto vs. No man will ſo much as doubt, whether our fame be in our power or not; for that the contrarie is palpably euident. The inference is infringible. And in truth, what is more manifeſt, then that the blaſts of other mẽs mouths, whereon conſiſteth this aëreal fame, which wee ſo highly eſteeme, cannot adde any true happineſſe vnto vs?

CIX. For, to omitte to diſpute of the nature and accidents of fame, dayly experience is able to conuince vs. Doe wee not behold obuious ſwarmes of ſuch, who in themſelues being vitious and miſerable, caſt not out notwithſtãding the moſt baſtardly and miſbegotten abortiue, I meane of their moſt ſhamefull actions, which is not

We may bee bad and famous.

ſtreight

ſtreight receiued with a confected applauſe, and Beare-like licked and filed with the voluble tongue of flatterie, that it is able not onely to paſſe vnmasked and vndiſcouered, but euen to outface the weaker and eaſily admiring apprehenſions, with the reſemblance of vertue, & greatneſſe? And is any man ſo vndiſcreete, as to imagine thoſe actions iuſtified, or the performers bettered thereby?

Dionyſius, Phalaris.

CX. What? thinke you any of thoſe infamous tyrants, and namely DIONYSIVS, PHALARIS, and ſuch others, whoſe cruelties haue beene ſo liuely ſette before our eyes by the ancients, to haue wanted acclamations and extollings? abſurde it were to thinke, there were then no Courtiers. What obtained they by ſuch prayſes? Surely nothing. Or if any

thing,

thing, what other but an incitement to cõtinue & goe forward in ſo vicious a habit? The people, with immoderate acclamations, receiued in the Theater at *Ceſarea* King AGRIPPA, crying, that hee ſeemed a God, not a man. But hee ſoone after oppreſſed with the moſt loathſome of all other diſeaſes (when hee was readie to breath foorth his vnhappie ſoule) ſayd, *En ego ille Deus veſter, morior. Behould, I that God of yours, am dying.* Endleſſe it were to follow on the numbers of ſuch examples. Let this ſuffice, that externall fame can no way amende the inwarde euill. *Agrippa.*

CXI. On the other ſide, who knoweth not, that externall infamie and diſpraiſe, abateth not, nor diminiſheth our internal good? How iuſt may we be, how tẽperate, *Good, and infamous.*

how

how constant, how wise, how vertuous, and with al this be not inglorious onely, but infamous? For the corrupt iudgement and peruerse wil of man, is not onely exercised in extolling of euill, but much more and often in snarling, & detracting of vertue. How many worthy men thinke you haue liued not more vnknown then misconstrued and contemned? How long did DEMOCRITVS seeme a mad man? how hardly did fame (and after many iniuries) admitte SOCRATES?

Democritus.

Socrates.

CXII. How long was the Citie of *Rome* ignoraunt of M. CATO, not vnderstanding him, vntill they lost him? Hee that whilest hee liued was the onely stay of their Commonwealths libertie; hee, who durst at once prouoke, and oppose himselfe to both the aspirers CÆSAR, and POMPEY, both whom the di-

M. Cato.

uided

uided Common-wealth did follow; hee, who neither outliued the libertie of his Common wealth, nor the libertie him; who (according vnto SENECA) was giuen by the immortall Gods, as a more certaine & cõpleate patterne of a wise man than either VLYSSES, or HERCVLES, so much by the *Stoickes* and *Cynickes* renowned and admired: [a] *Quid aliud quàm vociferatus est, & misit irritas voces, cùm modò per per populi leuatus manus, & obrutus sputis, & portandus extra foriũ traheretur, modò è senatu in carcerem duceretur? What other did hee but exclame, and send out words in vaine, whilest sometimes hoised vp by the peoples hands, and spit vpon, hee was haled by them foorth of the market place, sometimes was by the Senate throwen into prison?* No maruaile (saith LIPSIVS) though his time disesteemed him. *Et sua*

[a] Epist. XIV.

ri-

riserũt ſecula Mæonidẽ. But is there any man to be found ſo weake, as to eſteeme the leſſe of MARC. CATO? Is it not manifeſt, that thoſe oppoſitions were the cauſes of the diſcouerie of theſe ſo rare parts of his minde, which otherwiſe had beene hidden from vs? In reſpect of him, no doubt it was indifferent, whether the world tooke notice of the worthy conſtitutiõ of his mind, or not.

Democritus. Notice of his action, is ſuperfluous to a wiſe man. Epicurus.

CXIII. DEMOCRITVS was wont to ſay, *Vnus mihi pro populo eſt, & populus pro vno. One is to mee as the people, and the people as one*. And EPICVRVS writing to one of his conſorts in Philoſophie; *Hæc*, (ſaith hee) *ego non multis, ſed tibi: ſatis enim magnum alter alteri theatrum ſumus. Theſe I write not vnto many, but vnto thy-ſelfe: for wee are a ſtage large inough, each of vs vnto the other.*

And

And euen this Philoſopher, of whom wee ſpeake, ſo famous for learning, who hath left more monuments thereof, then any other Philoſopher whatſoeuer, in his life time was not onely vnknowne to *Greece*, but euen to *Athens*, neere the which hee lurked. For writing of himſelfe and METRODORVS his friend & aſſociate, he witneſſeth, *Ipſos illa nobilis* Græcia, *non ignotos ſolùm habuit, ſed penè inauditos. That noble Greece, had them not onely vnknowne, but almoſt vnheard.*

Metrodorus.

CXIV. As vertue receiueth no dammage, by being vnknowne, ſo nor he who poſſeſſeth it. Others haue the diſaduantage, by loſing the helpe of imitation by their miſtaking, or ignorãce. For, to thinke that wiſedome and vertue, do looſe any part of themſelues,

Obſcuritie not preiudiciall.

or are any whit the leſſe perfit, becauſe they are not fully vnderſtood, or are ſometimes miſcõſtrued; were to limit the perfection of them vnto our moſt weake capacities: then which, what more childiſh? What if you aſcribe the patient putting vp and bearing of an iniurie in a wiſe man, to fearefulneſſe or cowardiſe? the contempt of honour and dignities, to puſillanimitie? his modeſt taciturnitie, to churliſhneſſe? his neglect of riches, pleaſures, & ſuch like, to a ſilly ſottiſhneſſe?

Nor a falſe apprehenſion

CXV. Doth the falſehood of thy apprehenſion, make him leſſe patient, humble, ſilent, wiſe? None of theſe. What doth it then? It returneth backe vnto thy ſelfe with a double diſcommoditie. For beſides that thy iudgement is vnſound, it puniſheth thee with the want of that moſt expetible good, which from

the right interpretation of those vertues, would haue redounded vnto thee. For, since *Bonum est sui diffusiuum*; with how great good moughtest thou haue enriched thy selfe, by striuing to put in practise in thy selfe those vertues, which in him were so eminent? Now, in that thou erroniously esteemest them as vices, thou not onely losest the commodious imitation of so faire a patterne, the like wherof is sildome perhaps to bee had; but also art the faster fixed and enchained with thine owne euill, confirmed by his example in the contrarie to that it would giue thee, thy ignorance and mistaking leading thee to so foule a construction thereof. In any knowledge which wee haue, doth an other mans ignorance of our knowledge, any whit abbridge it?

Preiudiciall to the mistakers.

——vsque adeóne,
Scire tuum nihil est, nisi te scire hoc sciat alter?
What? doest thou therefore deeme thy knowledge nought,
Vnlesse another know, that thou know'st ought?

We loose our cheefe ende fame, if mistaken.

CXVI. True it is, that if thou makest fame thine end; then, if thou beest not knowne, not vnderstood, if thou beest misconstred, thou art vndone. How vaine a thing thinkest thou, is it then; when thy ende, thy onely scope, thy most desired happinesse, shall depend vpon so fickle and chaungeable a ground, as is the variable opinion of that many-headed monster, the Multitude? I omitte the baseneſse of this humour: Then which what is more vnworthie the erected constitution of a noble minde, I say, to make folly his iudge? To ad-

mit

mit a Iurie ouer himselfe, honoured with MIDAS eares, so as they make vp their number to boulster vp his desired verdit? To affect more, and to labour in that, which is pleasing, then which is good? O miserie, at lengthe to measure good and euill, by the pleasing acceptaunce, or repulse! For hitherto doth the corrupt opinion of this imaginarie good which is constituted in fame, lead a man: And, which is worst of all, alwaies or for the most part, to incurre the opposite to their expectation. For their end being to please, they lightly displease. But no maruaile; since, [a] *Omnis stultitia laborat fastidio sui. All folly doth loath it selfe.* Whereon these affected meanes to fame being founded, how can they do other but be vnconstant, and frustrate euen themselues?

Couetise to please, they displease.

a *Seneca*, Epist. IX.

CXVII. The baſeneſſe therfore and the ſtreightneſſe of this fame is ſhamefull to a wiſe man: whereof excellently [b] BOETHIVS,

Quicunque ſolam mente præcipiti petit,
Summumque credit, gloriam,
Latè patentis ætheris cernat plagas,
Arctúmque terrarum ſitum,
Breuem replere non valentis ambitum,
Pudebit auctì nominis.
Quid ô ſuperbi colla mortali iugo
Fruſtra leuare geſtiunt?
Licèt remotos fama per populos meãs
Diffuſa, linguas explicet,
Et magna titulis fulgeat claris domus
Mors ſpernit altam gloriam,
Inuoluit humile pariter & celſum caput,
Æquátque ſummis infima.

[b] Libri. 2. Metro. VII.

Vbi

Vbi nunc fidelis ossa Fabricij iacent?
Quid Brutus, aut rigidus Cato?
Signat superstes fama tenuis pauentis
Inane nomen litteris.
Sed quid decora nouimus vocabula?
Num scire consumptos datur?
Iacetis ergo prorsus ignorabiles,
Nec fama notos efficit.
Quòd si putatis longius vitam trahi
Mortalis aurâ nominis,
Cùm sera vobis rapiet hoc etiam dies,
Iam vos secunda mors manet.
Who headlong striueth after fame,
Placing therein his chiefe delight,
Let him behold th' extended skies,
And view the narrow streightned earth:
This arcted circuit will abash him,
Which yet his glorie cannot fill.

Why doe the proud in vaine endeuour
To free their neckes from mortall yoake?
Though fame through many people haſte,
It ſelfe diffuſing by their tongues,
And houſes boaſt of noble ſtocke,
Death diſdaineth ſwelling glorie,
Orewhelming both the rich and poore,
Aequalles the loweſt with the highe.
Where lye renoun'd FABRICIVS *boanes?*
Where BRVTVS, *and ſtrict* CATO *reſtes?*
A poore ſurviuing fame houldes vp
In letters fewe their emptie name.
What is our knowledge of theſe names?

Can those acquaint vs with the dead?
Wholly you therefore lye obscure,
Your fame can neuer make you knowne.
But if you thinke your life extended
By breathing of your mortall names,
When the late day of this depriues you,
A second death remaineth you.

CXIIX. For in truth, if a wise man shall iustly, in respect of himselfe, contemne that fame, which yet is iustly and vpon true causes giuen him; because it is too mean a thing either to profit or delight him: how lightly shall hee regard, how abiectly shall he esteeme of that, and of the giuers thereof, which vpon false grounde is erected? If hee determine to make vse

A wise man contemneth euen good fame.

of iuſt fame, as of a harbinger to that good, which hee indeuoureth to transferre into others; he practiſeth not that to the attaining thereof, which hee thinketh will moue euery iudgement to allow of it; but that which hee knoweth truely to bee laudable and prayſeworthy: which vertuous practiſe notwithſtanding, in relation to himſelfe, hee would not haue omitted, though there had beene no commendation annexed thereunto. Neither reſpecteth he, in this, thoſe onely who conuerſe with him, who liue in his time: hee encloſeth himſelfe not within ſo narrow boundes: [a] *Paucis* (ſaith SENECA) *natus eſt, qui populum ætatis ſuæ cogitat. Hee is borne to few, who reſpecteth but the people of his age:* but hee looketh to all after-liuers, to all ſucceeding ages. So farre hee admitteth the good eſtimation of himſelfe,

a Epiſt. LXXIX.

as hee extendeth his benefit: they haue both the ſame ende, both the ſame limit.

CXIX. But, if it bee ſo, that a wiſe man admitteth not ſuch prayſe, as erroniouſly is attributed vnto him; how farre thinke you is hee, from running into ſhamefull and affected actions, from ſeeking and endeuouring from ſo foule and inordinate meanes to attaine it, and that in reſpect of himſelfe only, and of the good which hee conceiueth to redounde frō thence? Truely hee is ſo farre, as hitherto wee haue ſeene, from ſtriuing vnto this; that in relation to himſelfe, hee vtterly deſpiſeth euen the moſt iuſt and moſt ſincere. So as, if hee liue retired to himſelfe, for that hee then hath not any conuenient vſe of this fame: hee remaineth wholly contented

Much more that which is euill.

with

A wise man contented with himselfe.

with himselfe. Nor seeketh he ought of them, to whom hee giueth nothing. Else wee should make him inferiour vnto the meanest.

CXX. But, as it is reported of the *Aegyptian* [b] *Pyramis*, so highe and erected is his height, so large and stable his foundation, that hee consumeth his owne shadow wholly within himselfe; that is, such vertue, such profitte, such delight hee findeth to bee attained within himselfe, that hee not so much as regardeth forth of himselfe, nor conceiueth the slightest thought, of what others may thinke & esteeme of him. He stãdeth cõceited of fame, as of a thing behoouefull & expedient to a good purpose; whereof for the present, things so stãding, he hath no vse. Otherwise, that the possession of glory as of it self it can adde no good, so neither can

[b] Mela. Solinus. Ammianus. Marcellinus lib. 22. Cassiod. form. 15. lib. 7. var. Ausonius etiam. Edyllio. III—quadro cui in fastigia cono Surgit & ipsa suas consumit Pyramis vmbras. & alii multi.

the

the priuation therof be hurtfull. The which hauing been hetherto in this diſcourſe ſufficiently proued; there reſteth now to diſcuſſe whether the poſſeſſion of that fame, which by inordinate and affected meanes is attained, bee not exceeding daungerous and preiudiciall vnto vs. Which, becauſe my time is ſtreightned, and my other occaſions enforce mee to take my hand from this table, ſhall copiouſly bee handled in the enſuing part: This beeing but a viewe or taſte of ſome general conſiderations, which were neceſſarily to bee premitted for the ordering of the whole. The other part, I hope, exemplyfyinge in the particulars of this vice, will out of them perſpicuouſly ſhewe, that not onely the priuation of fame is not preiudiciall, but alſo the poſſeſſion thereof, eſpecially of the

bad whereof we treat, most dangerous & auoidable: according vnto the saying of SENECA. [a] *Malus, vbi se bonum simulat, tunc est pessimus. An euill man, when he fayneth, and would haue himselfe taken for good, then becommeth hee worst of all.*

a In prouer.

FINIS.